

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA  
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES  
DIVISION OF AIR QUALITY

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF PUBLIC HEARING  
ON PROPOSED TEMPORARY AMENDMENT TO  
15A NCAC 02D .0544, PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT  
DETERIORATION REQUIREMENTS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES,  
AND  
15A NCAC 02Q .0502, APPLICABILITY

OCTOBER 1, 2014  
RALEIGH, NC

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT COMMISSION

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## CONTENTS

CHAPTER I	Summaries and Recommendations	I-1
	Background and Summary	I-1
	Comments and Responses Thereto	I-2
	Summary of Comments and Responses	I-5
	Conclusion	I-5
	Hearing Officer's Recommendation	I-6
CHAPTER II	Rules Proposed for Adoption	II-1
CHAPTER III	Report of Proceedings	III-1
	Introduction	III-1
	Designation of Hearing Officer	III-2
	Public Notice	III-3
	Transcript	III-5
CHAPTER IV	Exhibits	IV- 1
	Proposed Rules With Amendments as Presented at the Hearing	IV-2
	Hearing Officer Comments at Hearing	IV-5
CHAPTER V	Written Comments During Comment Period	V-1
CHAPTER VI	Attachments	VI-1
CHAPTER VII	Documentation	VII-1

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## CHAPTER I

**Summaries and Recommendations**

Proposed temporary amendment to Rule 15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases

**BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY**

A public hearing was held in Raleigh, North Carolina on October 1, 2014, to take public comments on amendments to Rule 15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases. Mr. Charlie Carter was appointed and acted as the hearing officer during the hearing.

On June 23, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) addressing the application of stationary source permitting requirements to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) or Title V permit.

Currently, sources are required to obtain a PSD permit as follows:

- new facilities emitting GHGs in excess of 100,000 tons per year (TPY) carbon dioxide equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>e)
- existing sources that are minor for PSD (including GHGs) before the modification and actual or potential emissions of GHGs from the modification alone would be equal to or greater than 100,000 TPY on a CO<sub>2</sub>e basis and equal to or greater than 100/250 TPY on a mass basis
- existing sources whose potential to emit (PTE) for GHGs is equal to or greater than 100,000 TPY on a CO<sub>2</sub>e basis and is equal to or greater than 100/250 TPY (depending on the source category) on a mass basis emissions increase and the net emissions increase of GHGs from the modification would be equal to or greater than 75,000 TPY on a CO<sub>2</sub>e basis and greater than zero TPY on a mass basis.

Title V permits are required for all sources that emit at least 100,000 tons of GHG per year on a CO<sub>2</sub>e basis.

15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

On July 24, 2014, Janet G. McCabe, Acting Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Air and Radiation, and Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, issued a memo outlining EPA's next steps for the agency's GHG permit program. In the memo, they wrote that the EPA will not apply or enforce the following regulatory requirements:

- Federal regulations or the EPA-approved PSD State Implementation Plan (SIP) provisions that require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit if GHG are the only pollutant (i) that the source emits or has the potential to emit above the major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase and a significant net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40 CFR 52.21 (b)(49)(v)).
- Federal regulations or provisions in the EPA-approved Title V programs that require a stationary source to obtain a Title V permit solely because the source emits or has the potential to emit GHG above the major source thresholds.

The EPA does not interpret the Supreme Court decision to preclude states from retaining permitting requirements for sources of GHG emissions that apply independently under state law even where those requirements are no longer required under federal law.

However, under North Carolina G.S. 150B-19.3(a), an agency may not adopt a rule that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation or requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(2), an agency shall seek to reduce the burden upon those persons or entities who must comply with the rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(6), rules shall be designed to achieve the regulatory objective in a cost-effective and timely manner.

### **PUBLIC COMMENTS AND RESPONSES THERETO**

**Comment:** Mr. Kyle Michael of Coastal Carolina Clean Power and Mr. Paolo Carollo of Carolina Cellulosic Biofuels support the EMC's effort to revise the PSD requirements in 15A NCAC 02D .0544. On June 23, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court rules that the EPA had overstepped its authority under the Clean Air Act to require projects undergo PSD review solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. Since DAQ's rule requiring a project undergo PSD review was based in its entirety upon EPA's regulations that the Supreme Court has found invalid, it is incumbent upon the EMC to implement changes to its corresponding rules. They ask the EMC to expedite passage of the proposed temporary rule to align DAQ rules with the recent Supreme Court decision.

**Response:** The EMC is proposing to adopt changes to the PSD requirements in 15A NCAC 02D .0544 and Title V applicability in 15A 02Q .0502 to align the DAQ rules with the June 23, 2014 Supreme Court decision. The amendments will remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit or facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions. The temporary rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is the quickest way to implement a rule change. The General Statutes specify the steps an

agency must take to adopt a temporary rule. The EMC is proceeding expeditiously through the temporary rulemaking process.

**Comment:** Mr. Lou Zeller of the Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League (BREDL), as presented by Ms. Therese Vick at the public hearing, comments that BREDL opposes the adoption of the proposed rules. He states that the DAQ public notice is incorrect as it interprets the recent Supreme Court decision as “the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit”. He states this is incorrect and what the Supreme Court did say is:

The Clean Air Act neither compels nor permits the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt an interpretation of the Clean Air Act requiring a stationary source of pollution to obtain a “Prevention of Significant Deterioration “ or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emission. However, EPA reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act to require sources that would need permits based on their emission of conventional pollutants to comply with “best available control technology” for greenhouse gases.

**Response:** The commenter in his comment provides two sections from the Syllabus to the Supreme Court decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency*. The first sentence in the above comment is from page 2 of the Syllabus that summarizes Justice Scalia’s opinion on pages 10 through 24 of the Supreme Court decision. These pages cover the analysis on whether EPA permissibly interpreted the statute to provide that a source may be required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse gas emissions. The Section is labelled “A. The PSD and Title V Triggers”.

On page 29 of the Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia’s opinion states “To sum up: We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary sources based on their greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, the Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of defining a ‘major emitting facility’ (or a ‘modification’ thereof) in the PSD context or a ‘major source’ in the Title V context.”

The second sentence in the above comment which is underlined for emphasis is from page 3 of the Syllabus that summarizes Justice Scalia’s opinion on pages 24 through 29 of the Supreme Court decision. These pages cover the analysis on whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require those (anyway) sources to comply with “best available control technology” emission standards for greenhouse gases. “Anyway” sources are those sources that would need permits based on their emissions of more conventional pollutants.

On page 29 of the Supreme Court decision, Justice Scalia’s opinion states “EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a ‘pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter’ for the purposes of requiring BACT for ‘anyway’ sources.”

The rules are proposed to be amended to be consistent with the Supreme Court decision. The amendments will remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit or facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

**Comment:** Mr. Lou Zeller of BREDL states that in his majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:

EPA's decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under *Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U.S. 837. The specific phrasing of the BACT provision – which requires BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under” the ACT, §7475(a)(4) – does not suggest that the provision can bear a narrowing construction. And even if the test were not clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to make EPA's interpretation unreasonable.

Mr. Lou Zeller further states in order to obtain PSD permits, air pollution sources must be subject to best available control technology for greenhouse gases.

**Response:** The paragraph on the majority opinion in the above comment is from page 3 of the Syllabus that summarizes Justice Scalia's opinion on pages 27 through 29 of the Supreme Court decision. This part of the decision covered the analysis for “anyway” sources. It did not apply to the permitting requirements for sources on the sole basis of its GHG emissions. The EMC is not proposing in the temporary rules any change to the permitting requirements for “anyway” sources.

**Comment:** Mr. Lou Zeller of BREDL states that through a series of (court) decisions, EPA has established the critical need for greenhouse gas reductions, the authority to set performance standards for power plants and other major sources, and confirmed that the Clean Air Act's requirement of BACT for PSD permits. As an agreement state, North Carolina must now implement the provisions of the Clean Air Act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Its primary enforcement authority –primacy- does not allow the DAQ to issue permits which do not conform to the minimums of federal regulations and does not allow the EMC to adopt rules less stringent than federal law. Nor does the General Assembly's limitation on certain environmental rules under NCGS 150B-19.3 sanction the adoption of substandard regulations. There is a floor established by the federal statutes below which no state may go.

**Response:** The federal regulations have not been amended since the Supreme Court decision to be consistent with the decision. On June 24, 2014, EPA issued a memorandum titled “Next Steps and Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Permitting Programs to Greenhouse Gases Following the Supreme Court's Decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency*”. In this memorandum, EPA explains how it intends to proceed at this point with respect to permit applications for Tailoring Rule "Step 2" sources and PSD modifications that were previously classified as major based solely on GHG emissions. The rules are proposed to be amended to be consistent with the Supreme Court decision and EPA's implementation memorandum.

**Comment:** Mr. Gil Vinzani of Piedmont Natural Gas asks if there is an opportunity for “not anyway” sources with PSD permits to go back and get a synthetic type permit. He also comments that he does support the rulemaking.

**Response:** An existing source that has a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of their greenhouse gas emissions would not have any applicable PSD or Title V permitting requirements. After the temporary rules are adopted, a source may revert back to its previous classification for conventional pollutants before GHG requirements were added to the permitting rules if the source requests a permit modification.

### **SUMMARY OF COMMENTS AND RESPONSES**

<b><u>Comments</u></b>	<b><u>Response</u></b>
Expedite passage of proposed temporary rule.	EMC is proceeding expeditiously through the temporary rulemaking process.
DAQ is incorrect in its interpretation of Supreme Court decision.	Proposed rules are consistent with Supreme Court decision.
To obtain a PSD permit, sources must be subject to BACT for greenhouse gases.	Only sources that would need permits based on their emissions of conventional pollutants would be subject to BACT.
Primacy does not allow DAQ to issue permits which do not conform to the minimums of federal regulations.	Rules are proposed to be amended to be consistent with the Supreme Court decision and EPA’s implementation memorandum.
Can existing “not anyway” sources modify their permitting requirements?	A source may request a permit modification back to its previous permitting classification.

### **CONCLUSION**

Four people commented on the proposed amendments during the comment period for the hearing record. Three people provided written comments for the hearing record and one person provided oral comments without written comments during the public hearing.

Three people support the rule amendments. Two commenters asked the EMC to expedite passage of the proposed temporary rule to align DAQ rules with the recent Supreme Court decision. The temporary rulemaking process under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) is the quickest way to implement a rule change for a change that does not qualify under the emergency rule procedures. The General Statutes specifies the steps an agency must take to adopt a temporary rule. The EMC is proceeding expeditiously through the temporary rulemaking process.

One person opposes the adoption of the proposed rules. The commenter states that DAQ is incorrect in its interpretation of the Supreme Court decision. The commenter also states that for sources to obtain a PSD permit, sources must be subject to BACT for greenhouse gases and that

as an agreement state, North Carolina must now implement the provisions of the Clean Air Act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Its primary enforcement authority –primacy- does not allow the DAQ to issue permits which do not conform to the minimums of federal regulations and does not allow the EMC to adopt rules less stringent than federal law. The Hearing Officer believes the proposed rules are consistent with the Supreme Court decision. No changes were made to the rules.

### **HEARING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATION**

The Hearing Officer recommends that the proposed temporary amendments as presented in Chapter II of this hearing report be adopted by the Environmental Management Commission.

1 15A NCAC 02D .0544 is proposed as a temporary rule as follows:

2  
3 **15A NCAC 02D .0544 PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION REQUIREMENTS FOR**  
4 **GREENHOUSE GASES**

5 (a) The purpose of this Rule is to implement a program for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality  
6 for greenhouse gases as required by 40 CFR 51.166. For purposes of greenhouse gases, the provisions of this Rule  
7 shall apply rather than the provisions of Rule .0530 of this Section. A major stationary source or major modification  
8 shall not be required to obtain a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit on the sole basis of its  
9 greenhouse gases emissions. For all other regulated new source review (NSR) pollutants, the provisions of Rule  
10 .0530 of this Section apply.

11 (b) For the purposes of this Rule, the definitions contained in 40 CFR 51.166(b) and 40 CFR 51.301 shall apply  
12 except the definition of "baseline actual emissions." "Baseline actual emissions" means the rate of emissions, in  
13 tons per year, of a regulated NSR pollutant, as determined in accordance with Subparagraphs (1) through (3) of this  
14 Paragraph:

15 (1) For an existing emissions unit, baseline actual emissions means the average rate, in tons per year,  
16 at which the emissions unit actually emitted the pollutant during any consecutive 24-month period  
17 selected by the owner or operator within the 5-year period immediately preceding the date that a  
18 complete permit application is received by the Division for a permit required under this Rule. The  
19 Director shall allow a different time period, not to exceed 10 years immediately preceding the date  
20 that a complete permit application is received by the Division, if the owner or operator  
21 demonstrates that it is more representative of normal source operation. For the purpose of  
22 determining baseline actual emissions, the following shall apply:

23 (A) The average rate shall include fugitive emissions to the extent quantifiable, and emissions  
24 associated with startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions;

25 (B) The average rate shall be adjusted downward to exclude any non-compliant emissions  
26 that occurred while the source was operating above any emission limitation that was  
27 legally enforceable during the consecutive 24-month period;

28 (C) For an existing emission unit (other than an electric utility steam generating unit), the  
29 average rate shall be adjusted downward to exclude any emissions that would have  
30 exceeded an emission limitation with which the major stationary source must currently  
31 comply. However, if the State has taken credit in an attainment demonstration or  
32 maintenance plan consistent with the requirements of 40 CFR 51.165(a)(3)(ii)(G) for an  
33 emission limitation that is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard that  
34 the Administrator proposed or promulgated under part 63 of the Code of Federal  
35 Regulations, the baseline actual emissions shall be adjusted to account for such emission  
36 reductions;

- 1 (D) For an electric utility steam generating unit, the average rate shall be adjusted downward  
2 to reflect any emissions reductions under G.S. 143-215.107D and for which cost recovery  
3 is sought pursuant to G.S. 62-133.6;
- 4 (E) For a regulated NSR pollutant, when a project involves multiple emissions units, only  
5 one consecutive 24-month period shall be used to determine the baseline actual emissions  
6 for all the emissions units being changed. A different consecutive 24-month period for  
7 each regulated NSR pollutant can be used for each regulated NSR pollutant; and
- 8 (F) The average rate shall not be based on any consecutive 24-month period for which there  
9 is inadequate information for determining annual emissions, in tons per year, and for  
10 adjusting this amount if required by Parts (B) and (C) of this Subparagraph;
- 11 (2) For a new emissions unit, the baseline actual emissions for purposes of determining the emissions  
12 increase that will result from the initial construction and operation of such unit shall equal zero;  
13 and thereafter, for all other purposes, shall equal the unit's potential to emit; and
- 14 (3) For a plantwide applicability limit (PAL) for a stationary source, the baseline actual emissions  
15 shall be calculated for existing emissions units in accordance with the procedures contained in  
16 Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and for a new emissions unit in accordance with the  
17 procedures contained in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph.
- 18 (c) In the definition of "net emissions increase," the reasonable period specified in 40 CFR 51.166(b)(3)(ii) shall be  
19 seven years.
- 20 (d) The limitation specified in 40 CFR 51.166(b)(15)(ii) shall not apply.
- 21 (e) Major stationary sources and major modifications shall comply with the requirements contained in 40 CFR  
22 51.166(i) and (a)(7) and by extension in 40 CFR 51.166(j) through (o) and (w). The transition provisions allowed by  
23 40 CFR 52.21 (i)(11)(i) and (ii) and (m)(1)(vii) and (viii) are hereby adopted under this Rule. The minimum  
24 requirements described in the portions of 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph are hereby adopted as the  
25 requirements to be used under this Rule, except as otherwise provided in this Rule. Wherever the language of the  
26 portions of 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph speaks of the "plan," the requirements described therein  
27 shall apply to the source to which they pertain, except as otherwise provided in this Rule. Whenever the portions of  
28 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph provide that the State plan may exempt or not apply certain  
29 requirements in certain circumstances, those exemptions and provisions of nonapplicability are also hereby adopted  
30 under this Rule. However, this provision shall not be interpreted so as to limit information that may be requested  
31 from the owner or operator by the Director as specified in 40 CFR 51.166(n)(2).
- 32 (f) 40 CFR 51.166(w)(10)(iv)(a) is changed to read: "If the emissions level calculated in accordance with Paragraph  
33 (w)(6) of this Section is equal to or greater than 80 percent of the PAL [plant wide applicability limit] level, the  
34 Director shall renew the PAL at the same level." 40 CFR 51.166(w)(10)(iv)(b) is not incorporated by reference.
- 35 (g) 15A NCAC 02Q .0102 and .0302 are not applicable to any source to which this Rule applies. The owner or  
36 operator of the sources to which this Rule applies shall apply for and receive a permit as required in 15A NCAC  
37 02Q .0300 or .0500.

1 (h) When a particular source or modification becomes a major stationary source or major modification solely by  
2 virtue of a relaxation in any enforceable limitation which was established after August 7, 1980, on the capacity of  
3 the source or modification to emit a pollutant, such as a restriction on hours of operation, then the provisions of this  
4 Rule shall apply to the source or modification as though construction had not yet begun on the source or  
5 modification.

6 (i) The provisions of 40 CFR 52.21(r)(2) regarding the period of validity of approval to construct are incorporated  
7 by reference except that the term "Administrator" is replaced with "Director".

8 (j) Permits may be issued based on innovative control technology as set forth in 40 CFR 51.166(s)(1) if the  
9 requirements of 40 CFR 51.166(s)(2) have been met, subject to the condition of 40 CFR 51.166(s)(3), and with the  
10 allowance set forth in 40 CFR 51.166(s)(4).

11 (k) A permit application subject to this Rule shall be processed in accordance with the procedures and requirements  
12 of 40 CFR 51.166(q). Within 30 days of receipt of the application, applicants shall be notified if the application is  
13 complete as to initial information submitted. Commencement of construction before full prevention of significant  
14 deterioration approval is obtained constitutes a violation of this Rule.

15 (l) Approval of an application with regard to the requirements of this Rule shall not relieve the owner or operator of  
16 the responsibility to comply fully with applicable provisions of other rules of this Subchapter or Subchapter 02Q of  
17 this Title and any other requirements under local, state, or federal law.

18 (m) If the owner or operator of a source is using projected actual emissions to avoid applicability of prevention of  
19 significant deterioration requirements, the owner or operator shall notify the Director of the modification before  
20 beginning actual construction. The notification shall include:

- 21 (1) a description of the project;
- 22 (2) identification of sources whose emissions could be affected by the project;
- 23 (3) the calculated projected actual emissions and an explanation of how the projected actual emissions  
24 were calculated, including identification of emissions excluded by 40 CFR 51.166(b)(40)(ii)(c);
- 25 (4) the calculated baseline actual emissions and an explanation of how the baseline actual emissions  
26 were calculated; and
- 27 (5) any netting calculations if applicable.

28 If upon reviewing the notification, the Director finds that the project will cause a prevention of significant  
29 deterioration evaluation, then the Director shall notify the owner or operator of his findings. The owner or operator  
30 shall not make the modification until the owner or operator has received a permit issued pursuant to this Rule. If a  
31 permit revision is not required pursuant to this Rule, the owner or operator shall maintain records of annual  
32 emissions in tons per year, on a calendar year basis related to the modifications for 10 years following resumption of  
33 regular operations after the change if the project involves increasing the emissions unit's design capacity or its  
34 potential to emit the regulated NSR pollutant; otherwise these records shall be maintained for five years following  
35 resumption of regular operations after the change. The owner or operator shall submit a report to the Director within  
36 60 days after the end of each year during which these records must be generated. The report shall contain the items  
37 listed in 40 CFR 51.166(r)(6)(v)(a) through (c). The owner or operator shall make the information documented and

1 maintained under this Paragraph available to the Director or the general public pursuant to the requirements in 40  
2 CFR 70.4(b)(3)(viii).

3 (n) The references to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in this Rule are incorporated by reference unless a  
4 specific reference states otherwise. The version of the CFR incorporated in this Rule is that as of July 20, 2011 at  
5 <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-20/pdf/2011-17256.pdf> and does not include any subsequent  
6 amendments or editions to the referenced material. This Rule is applicable in accordance with 40 CFR 51.166(b)(48)  
7 and (b)(49)(iv) and (v).

8

9 *History Note:* Authority G.S. 143-215.3(a)(1); 143-215.107(a)(3); 143-215.107(a)(5); 143-215.107(a)(7); 143-  
10 215.108(b); 150B-21.6;

11 *Eff. January 28, 2011 pursuant to E.O. 81, Beverly E. Perdue;*

12 *Pursuant to G.S. 150B-21.3(c), a bill was not ratified by the General Assembly to disapprove this*  
13 *rule;*

14 *Temporary Amendment Eff. December 23, 2011;*

15 *Amended Eff. July 1, ~~2012-2012~~;*

16 *Temporary Amendment Eff. \_\_\_\_\_.*

17

18 15A NCAC 02Q .0502 is proposed as a temporary rule as follows:

19

20 **15A NCAC 02Q .0502 APPLICABILITY**

21 (a) Except as provided in Paragraph (b) or (c) of this Rule, the following facilities are required to obtain a permit  
22 under this Section:

23 (1) major facilities;

24 (2) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 2D .0524 or 40 CFR Part 60, except new residential  
25 wood heaters;

26 (3) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 2D .1110 or 40 CFR Part 61, except asbestos  
27 demolition and renovation activities;

28 (4) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 2D .1111 or 40 CFR Part 63 or any other standard or  
29 other requirement under Section 112 of the federal Clean Air Act, except that a source is not  
30 required to obtain a permit solely because it is subject to rules or requirements under Section  
31 112(r) of the federal Clean Air Act;

32 (5) facilities to which 15A NCAC 2D .0517(2), .0528, .0529, or .0534 applies;

33 (6) facilities with a source subject to Title IV or 40 CFR Part 72; or

34 (7) facilities in a source category designated by EPA as subject to the requirements of 40 CFR Part  
35 70.

1 (b) This Section does not apply to minor facilities with sources subject to requirements of 15A NCAC 2D .0524,  
2 .1110, or .1111 or 40 CFR Part 60, 61, or 63 until EPA requires these facilities to have a permit under 40 CFR Part  
3 70.

4 (c) A facility shall not be required to obtain a permit under this Section on the sole basis of its greenhouse gas  
5 emissions.

6 ~~(d)~~ Once a facility is subject to this Section because of emissions of one pollutant, the owner or operator of that  
7 facility shall submit an application that includes all sources of all regulated air pollutants located at the facility  
8 except for insignificant activities because of category.

9

10 *History Note: Filed as a Temporary Adoption Eff. March 8, 1994 for a period of 180 days or until the permanent*  
11 *rule becomes effective, whichever is sooner;*

12 *Authority G.S. 143-215.3(a)(1); 143-215.107(a)(10); 143-215.108;*

13 *Eff. July 1, 1994;*

14 *Amended Eff. July 1, 1996;*

15 *Temporary Amendment Eff. December 1, 1999;*

16 *Amended Eff. July 1, ~~2000-2000~~;*

17 *Temporary Amendment Eff.*

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CHAPTER III  
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

**Introduction**

The Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of Air Quality, held a public hearing on October 1, 2014 at 3:30pm in Raleigh, NC.

The hearing considered the proposed temporary amendments to Rules 15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases and 15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability.

The proposed effective date for this rule is projected to be December 2, 2014.

A public notice announcing this hearing was emailed to each person on the interested party email distribution list. The public notice was also posted on the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings website and North Carolina Division of Air Quality website at least five days before the public hearing.



## ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT COMMISSION

NORTH CAROLINA  
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL  
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September 11, 2014

### MEMORANDUM

TO: Charles Carter

From: Benne C. Hutson

Subject: Hearing Officer Appointment

Public hearings have been scheduled for October 1, 2014 at 3:30 p.m. at the Division of Air Quality central office in Raleigh, Room 1210, to receive public comments temporary amendments to Prevention of Significant Deterioration for Greenhouse Gases and Title V Permit Applicability rules. The attached public notice describes the hearing's purpose.

I am hereby appointing you to serve as hearing officer for this hearing. Please receive all relevant public comment and report your findings and recommendations to the Environmental Management Commission. Ms. Joelle Burleson will provide staff support for you.

If you have any questions, please feel free to contact Joelle Burleson at (919) 707-8720, or me.

SCH/jb

Attachment

cc: Sheila Holman  
Lois Thomas  
Hearing Record File

## NORTH CAROLINA ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT COMMISSION

## PUBLIC NOTICE

Notice is hereby given for one public hearing to be heard by the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of Air Quality concerning the proposed temporary amendments to air quality rules.

## PURPOSE:

To receive comments on temporary amendments to the prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) rule for greenhouse gases (GHG) and Title V permit applicability rule.

15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

On June 23, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)* addressing the application of stationary source permitting requirements to GHG emissions. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit.

Under North Carolina G.S. 150B-19.3(a), an agency may not adopt a rule that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation or requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(2), an agency shall seek to reduce the burden upon those persons or entities who must comply with the rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(6), rules shall be designed to achieve the regulatory objective in a cost-effective and timely manner. Therefore, temporary rule amendments are necessary to ensure that stationary sources would not be required to unnecessarily obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of their GHG emissions while the Environmental Management Commission completes the permanent rulemaking process.

**DATES AND LOCATION:** October 1, 2014, 3:30 P.M.  
Training Room (#1210), DENR Green Square Office  
Building, 217 West Jones Street, Raleigh, NC, 27603

**COMMENT PROCEDURES:** All persons interested in these matters are invited to attend the public hearings. **Any person desiring to comment is requested to submit a written statement for inclusion in the record of proceedings at the public hearing.** The hearing officer may limit the length of oral presentations if many people want to speak. The hearing record will remain open until October 9, 2014 to receive additional written statements. To be included, the statement must be received by the Division by October 9, 2014.


**INFORMATION:** Copies of the proposed rule changes may be downloaded at <http://www.ncair.org/rules/hearing/>. Copies of the proposals may also be reviewed at the regional offices of the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Division of Air Quality, located at the following cities:

Asheville	828/296-4500
Fayetteville	910/433-3300
Mooresville	704/663-1699
Raleigh	919/791-4200
Washington	252/946-6481
Wilmington	910/796-7215
Winston-Salem	336/771-5000

Comments should be sent to and additional information concerning the hearings or the proposals may be obtained by contacting:

Ms. Joelle Burleson  
Division of Air Quality  
1641 Mail Service Center  
Raleigh, North Carolina 27699-1641  
(919) 707-8720 Phone/Fax  
[daq.publiccomments@ncdenr.gov](mailto:daq.publiccomments@ncdenr.gov)

DATE: 9/12/14

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Sheila Holman,  
DAQ Director

for S.H.

Transcript

A transcript of the October 1, 2014 hearing has not been prepared; however, an audio recording of the proceeding will be kept on file with the Division of Air Quality for one year from the date of the final actions by the Environmental Management Commission.

A list of those attending the hearing as follows:

Hearing Officers:

Mr. Charlie Carter, member of the Environmental Management Commission

Staff Members at the Raleigh hearing:

Ms. Joelle Burlison, DAQ, DENR

Mr. Patrick Knowlson, DAQ, DENR

Mr. Glenn Sappie, DAQ, DENR

Mr. Vladimir Zaytsev, DAQ, DENR

Members of the General Public:

Ms. Therese Vick, Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League

Mr. Gil Vinzani, Piedmont Natural Gas Co.

Mr. John Cooper, ChemTex International

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## CHAPTER IV

## EXHIBITS

<u>EXHIBIT</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Proposed temporary rules as published on the office of administrative hearings website and presented at the hearing	IV-2
Hearing Officer comments at the public hearing	IV-5

**Note from the Codifier:** The OAH website includes notices and the text of proposed temporary rules as required by G.S. 150B-21.1(a1). Prior to the agency adopting the temporary rule, the agency must hold a public hearing no less than five days after the rule and notice have been published and must accept comments for at least 15 business days.

For questions, you may contact the Office of Administrative Hearings at 919.431.3000 or email [oah.postmaster@oah.nc.gov](mailto:oah.postmaster@oah.nc.gov).

## TITLE 15A – DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

**Rulemaking Agency:** *Environmental Management Commission*

**Codifier of Rules received for publication the following notice and proposed temporary rule(s) on:** *September 11, 2014*

**Rule Citations:** *15A NCAC 02D .0544; 02Q .0502*

**Public Hearing:**

**Date:** *October 1, 2014*

**Time:** *3:30 p.m.*

**Location:** *Training Room (#1210), DENR Green Square Office Building, 217 West Jones Street, Raleigh, NC 27603*

**Reason:** *On June 23, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) addressing the application of stationary source permitting requirements to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) or Title V permit.*

*To reflect the Court decision, 15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions. 15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.*

*Under North Carolina G.S. 150B-19.3(a), an agency may not adopt a rule that imposes a more restrictive standard, limitation or requirement than those imposed by federal law or rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(2), an agency shall seek to reduce the burden upon those persons or entities who must comply with the rule. Under G.S. 150B-19.1(a)(6), rules shall be designed to achieve the regulatory objective in a cost-effective and timely manner. Therefore, temporary rule amendments are necessary to ensure that stationary sources would not be required to unnecessarily obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of their GHG emissions while the Environmental Management Commission completes the permanent rulemaking process.*

**Comment Procedures:** *Comments from the public shall be directed to: Joelle Burleson, Division of Air Quality, 1641 Mail Service Center, Raleigh, NC 27699-1641; phone (919) 707-8720; fax (919) 707-8720; email [daq.publiccomments@ncdenr.gov](mailto:daq.publiccomments@ncdenr.gov) (Please type "PSD and Title V Permitting for Greenhouse Gases" in the subject line). The comment period begins September 11, 2014 and ends October 9, 2014.*

### CHAPTER 02 – ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT COMMISSION

#### SUBCHAPTER 02D – AIR POLLUTION CONTROL REQUIREMENTS

##### SECTION .0500 – EMISSION CONTROL STANDARDS

#### **15A NCAC 02D .0544 PREVENTION OF SIGNIFICANT DETERIORATION REQUIREMENTS FOR GREENHOUSE GASES**

(a) The purpose of this Rule is to implement a program for the prevention of significant deterioration of air quality for greenhouse gases as required by 40 CFR 51.166. For purposes of greenhouse gases, the provisions of this Rule shall apply rather than the provisions of Rule .0530 of this Section. A major stationary source or major modification shall not be required to obtain a prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permit on the sole basis of its greenhouse gases emissions. For all other regulated new source review (NSR) pollutants, the provisions of Rule .0530 of this Section apply.

(b) For the purposes of this Rule, the definitions contained in 40 CFR 51.166(b) and 40 CFR 51.301 shall apply except the definition of "baseline actual emissions." "Baseline actual emissions" means the rate of emissions, in tons per year, of a regulated NSR pollutant, as determined in accordance with Subparagraphs (1) through (3) of this Paragraph:

- (1) For an existing emissions unit, baseline actual emissions means the average rate, in tons per year, at which the emissions unit actually emitted the pollutant during any consecutive 24-month period selected by the owner or operator within the 5-year period immediately preceding the date that a complete permit application is received by the Division for a permit required under this Rule. The Director shall allow a different time period, not to exceed 10 years immediately preceding the date that a complete permit application is received by the Division, if the owner or operator demonstrates that it is more representative of normal source operation. For the purpose of determining baseline actual emissions, the following shall apply:

- (A) The average rate shall include fugitive emissions to the extent quantifiable, and emissions associated with startups, shutdowns, and malfunctions;
- (B) The average rate shall be adjusted downward to exclude any non-compliant emissions that occurred while the source was operating above any emission limitation that was legally enforceable during the consecutive 24-month period;
- (C) For an existing emission unit (other than an electric utility steam generating unit), the average rate shall be adjusted downward to exclude any emissions that would have exceeded an emission limitation with which the major stationary source must currently comply. However, if the State has taken credit in an attainment demonstration or maintenance plan consistent with the requirements of 40 CFR 51.165(a)(3)(ii)(G) for an emission limitation that is part of a maximum achievable control technology standard that the Administrator proposed or promulgated under part 63 of the Code of Federal Regulations, the baseline actual emissions shall be adjusted to account for such emission reductions;
- (D) For an electric utility steam generating unit, the average rate shall be adjusted downward to reflect any emissions reductions under G.S. 143-215.107D and for which cost recovery is sought pursuant to G.S. 62-133.6;
- (E) For a regulated NSR pollutant, when a project involves multiple emissions units, only one consecutive 24-month period shall be used to determine the baseline actual emissions for all the emissions units being changed. A different consecutive 24-month period for each regulated NSR pollutant can be used for each regulated NSR pollutant; and
- (F) The average rate shall not be based on any consecutive 24-month period for which there is inadequate information for determining annual emissions, in tons per year, and for adjusting this amount if required by Parts (B) and (C) of this Subparagraph;
- (2) For a new emissions unit, the baseline actual emissions for purposes of determining the emissions increase that will result from the initial construction and operation of such unit shall equal zero; and thereafter, for all other purposes, shall equal the unit's potential to emit; and
- (3) For a plantwide applicability limit (PAL) for a stationary source, the baseline actual emissions shall be calculated for existing emissions units in accordance with the procedures contained in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and for a new emissions unit in accordance with the procedures contained in Subparagraph (2) of this Paragraph.
- (c) In the definition of "net emissions increase," the reasonable period specified in 40 CFR 51.166(b)(3)(ii) shall be seven years.
- (d) The limitation specified in 40 CFR 51.166(b)(15)(ii) shall not apply.
- (e) Major stationary sources and major modifications shall comply with the requirements contained in 40 CFR 51.166(i) and (a)(7) and by extension in 40 CFR 51.166(j) through (o) and (w). The transition provisions allowed by 40 CFR 52.21 (i)(11)(i) and (ii) and (m)(1)(vii) and (viii) are hereby adopted under this Rule. The minimum requirements described in the portions of 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph are hereby adopted as the requirements to be used under this Rule, except as otherwise provided in this Rule. Wherever the language of the portions of 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph speaks of the "plan," the requirements described therein shall apply to the source to which they pertain, except as otherwise provided in this Rule. Whenever the portions of 40 CFR 51.166 referenced in this Paragraph provide that the State plan may exempt or not apply certain requirements in certain circumstances, those exemptions and provisions of nonapplicability are also hereby adopted under this Rule. However, this provision shall not be interpreted so as to limit information that may be requested from the owner or operator by the Director as specified in 40 CFR 51.166(n)(2).
- (f) 40 CFR 51.166(w)(10)(iv)(a) is changed to read: "If the emissions level calculated in accordance with Paragraph (w)(6) of this Section is equal to or greater than 80 percent of the PAL [plant wide applicability limit] level, the Director shall renew the PAL at the same level." 40 CFR 51.166(w)(10)(iv)(b) is not incorporated by reference.
- (g) 15A NCAC 02Q .0102 and .0302 are not applicable to any source to which this Rule applies. The owner or operator of the sources to which this Rule applies shall apply for and receive a permit as required in 15A NCAC 02Q .0300 or .0500.
- (h) When a particular source or modification becomes a major stationary source or major modification solely by virtue of a relaxation in any enforceable limitation which was established after August 7, 1980, on the capacity of the source or modification to emit a pollutant, such as a restriction on hours of operation, then the provisions of this Rule shall apply to the source or modification as though construction had not yet begun on the source or modification.
- (i) The provisions of 40 CFR 52.21(r)(2) regarding the period of validity of approval to construct are incorporated by reference except that the term "Administrator" is replaced with "Director".
- (j) Permits may be issued based on innovative control technology as set forth in 40 CFR 51.166(s)(1) if the requirements of 40 CFR 51.166(s)(2) have been met, subject to the condition of 40 CFR 51.166(s)(3), and with the allowance set forth in 40 CFR 51.166(s)(4).
- (k) A permit application subject to this Rule shall be processed in accordance with the procedures and requirements of 40 CFR 51.166(q). Within 30 days of receipt of the application, applicants shall be notified if the application is complete as to initial information submitted. Commencement of construction before full prevention of significant deterioration approval is obtained constitutes a violation of this Rule.
- (l) Approval of an application with regard to the requirements of this Rule shall not relieve the owner or operator of the responsibility to comply fully with applicable provisions of other rules of this Subchapter or Subchapter 02Q of this Title and any other requirements under local, state, or federal law.
- (m) If the owner or operator of a source is using projected actual emissions to avoid applicability of prevention of significant deterioration requirements, the owner or operator shall notify the Director of the modification before beginning actual construction. The notification shall include:
- (1) a description of the project;
  - (2) identification of sources whose emissions could be affected by the project;

- (3) the calculated projected actual emissions and an explanation of how the projected actual emissions were calculated, including identification of emissions excluded by 40 CFR 51.166(b)(40)(ii)(c);
- (4) the calculated baseline actual emissions and an explanation of how the baseline actual emissions were calculated; and
- (5) any netting calculations if applicable.

If upon reviewing the notification, the Director finds that the project will cause a prevention of significant deterioration evaluation, then the Director shall notify the owner or operator of his findings. The owner or operator shall not make the modification until the owner or operator has received a permit issued pursuant to this Rule. If a permit revision is not required pursuant to this Rule, the owner or operator shall maintain records of annual emissions in tons per year, on a calendar year basis related to the modifications for 10 years following resumption of regular operations after the change if the project involves increasing the emissions unit's design capacity or its potential to emit the regulated NSR pollutant; otherwise these records shall be maintained for five years following resumption of regular operations after the change. The owner or operator shall submit a report to the Director within 60 days after the end of each year during which these records must be generated. The report shall contain the items listed in 40 CFR 51.166(r)(6)(v)(a) through (c). The owner or operator shall make the information documented and maintained under this Paragraph available to the Director or the general public pursuant to the requirements in 40 CFR 70.4(b)(3)(viii).

(n) The references to the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) in this Rule are incorporated by reference unless a specific reference states otherwise. The version of the CFR incorporated in this Rule is that as of July 20, 2011 at <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-07-20/pdf/2011-17256.pdf> and does not include any subsequent amendments or editions to the referenced material. This Rule is applicable in accordance with 40 CFR 51.166(b)(48) and (b)(49)(iv) and (v).

*Authority G.S. 143-215.3(a)(1); 143-215.107(a)(3); 143-215.107(a)(5); 143-215.107(a)(7); 143-215.108(b); 150B-21.6;*

## SUBCHAPTER 02Q – AIR QUALITY PERMITS PROCEDURES

### SECTION .0500 – TITLE V PROCEDURES

#### 15A NCAC 02Q .0502 APPLICABILITY

- (a) Except as provided in Paragraph (b) or (c) of this Rule, the following facilities are required to obtain a permit under this Section:
- (1) major facilities;
  - (2) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 02D .0524 or 40 CFR Part 60, except new residential wood heaters;
  - (3) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 02D .1110 or 40 CFR Part 61, except asbestos demolition and renovation activities;
  - (4) facilities with a source subject to 15A NCAC 02D .1111 or 40 CFR Part 63 or any other standard or other requirement under Section 112 of the federal Clean Air Act, except that a source is not required to obtain a permit solely because it is subject to rules or requirements under Section 112(r) of the federal Clean Air Act;
  - (5) facilities to which 15A NCAC 02D .0517(2), .0528, .0529, or .0534 applies;
  - (6) facilities with a source subject to Title IV or 40 CFR Part 72; or
  - (7) facilities in a source category designated by EPA as subject to the requirements of 40 CFR Part 70.
- (b) This Section does not apply to minor facilities with sources subject to requirements of 15A NCAC 02D .0524, .1110, or .1111 or 40 CFR Part 60, 61, or 63 until EPA requires these facilities to have a permit under 40 CFR Part 70.
- (c) A facility shall not be required to obtain a permit under this Section on the sole basis of its greenhouse gas emissions.
- ~~(d)~~ Once a facility is subject to this Section because of emissions of one pollutant, the owner or operator of that facility shall submit an application that includes all sources of all regulated air pollutants located at the facility except for insignificant activities because of category.

*Authority G.S. 143-215.3(a)(1); 143-215.107(a)(10); 143-215.108;*

## Hearing Officer's Suggested Hearing Comments

### INTRODUCTION

[Hearing officer]:

Good evening ladies and gentlemen. My name is Charlie Carter. I am a member of the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission. My role as hearing officer is to listen to all relevant comment on these proceedings and report them to the full commission. Sitting with me is Ms. Joelle Burleson. She is with the North Carolina Division of Air Quality, Planning Section.

Some of the staff from the Division of Air Quality are here to assist. Ms. Burleson, please introduce the staff present.

[Ms. Burleson] (Introduces staff)

[Hearing officer]:

This evening we are conducting one hearing. During the hearing we will take comments concerning the temporary amendments to Rules 15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) Requirements for Greenhouse Gases and 15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability. This hearing will be held according to the North Carolina Administrative Procedures Act. The public notice for this hearing has been published on the North Carolina Office of Administrative Hearings website and Division of Air Quality website. The public notice also has been emailed to those on the DAQ email distribution list. I will enter the public notice and the proposed temporary amendment into the hearing record without reading them at this time.

It would be helpful if any person desiring to comment also submit a written statement for inclusion into the hearing record. Once called to speak, please come to the podium and state your name clearly, identify the rule or rules you are commenting on, and whom you represent.

I will now open the hearing and take relevant comments on the temporary rule amendments to the PSD rule for greenhouse gases (GHG) and Title V permit applicability rule.

On June 23, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)* addressing the application of stationary source permitting requirements to GHG emissions. In its decision, the Supreme Court said that the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit.

On July 24, 2014, Janet G. McCabe, Acting Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Air and Radiation, and Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator, EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance, wrote a memo outlining EPA's next steps for the agency's GHG permit program. In the memo, they wrote that the EPA will not apply or enforce the following regulatory requirements:

- Federal regulations or the EPA-approved PSD SIP provisions that require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit if GHG are the only pollutant (i) that the source emits or has the potential to emit above the major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase and a significant net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40 CFR52.21 (b)(49)(v)).
- Federal regulations or provisions in the EPA-approved Title V programs that require a stationary source to obtain a Title V permit solely because the source emits or has the potential to emit GHG above the major source thresholds.

15A NCAC 02D .0544, Prevention of Significant Deterioration Requirements for Greenhouse Gases, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that major stationary sources obtain a PSD permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

15A NCAC 02Q .0502, Applicability, is proposed for temporary amendment to remove the requirement that facilities obtain a Title V permit on the sole basis of its GHG emissions.

{ optional script if there are a large number of speakers }

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[Hearing officer]:        Optional Time Limit

Many people have requested to speak at this hearing. Due to time constraints, speakers' presentations will be limited to \_\_\_ minutes. It would be helpful if speakers would also submit a written statement by the close of the comment period for inclusion into the hearing record.

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[Hearing officer]:

I will now take any comments that you may have.

[SPEAKERS]

[Hearing officer]:

Is there anyone else who would like to comment? If there are no more comments, then this hearing is closed. The hearing record will remain open until October 9, 2014, for additional written comments.

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## CHAPTER V

## COMMENTS DURING THE COMMENT PERIOD

## INDEX OF COMMENTERS

<u>NAME</u>	<u>REPRESENTING</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Therese Vick	Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League	V-2
Paolo Carollo	Carolina Cellulosic Biofuels	V-5
Kyle Michael	Coastal Carolina Clean Power	V-7
Gil Vinzani	Piedmont Natural Gas Co.	V-8

# Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League

www.BREDL.org PO Box 88 Glendale Springs, North Carolina 28629 BREDL@skybest.com (336) 982-2691

October 1, 2014

Ms. Joelle Burleson  
Division of Air Quality  
Public Hearing, Raleigh, NC

**RE: 15A NCAC 02D .0544 and 02Q .0502**

Temporary Amendments to PSD Rule for GHG and Title V Permit Applicability Rule

**Background**

The questions placed before the public today are: 1) shall the state remove the requirement for major sources of air pollution to obtain PSD permits based on their Greenhouse Gas emissions, and 2) shall the state remove the requirement for industrial facilities to obtain Title V Permits based on their GHG emissions? Both are proposed as temporary amendments to state air permit rules. In its public notice, the Division of Air Quality cites the recent Supreme Court decision addressing the applicability of greenhouse gas emissions to stationary source PSD and Title V permits.<sup>1</sup> Also, the DAQ cites the state statute limiting state agencies' ability to adopt rules more stringent than federal law or rule.<sup>2</sup> The notice ends with justifications of the proposed temporary rules as reducing regulatory burden and promoting cost-effectiveness.

**Recommendation**

The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League flatly opposes the adoption of the proposed rules. The Division's regulatory analysis is unsound and its reading of the federal law is fatally flawed. We recommend that the Division of Air Quality abandon the current attempt to adopt temporary amendments to the state rules for greenhouse gasses and instead implement clear standards for the reduction of these pollutants. Three court decisions have now upheld EPA greenhouse gas reductions. Consequently, the state's primacy—its principal enforcement authority—in air pollution regulation requires a systematic, comprehensive approach to greenhouse gas reductions in North Carolina.

**The Law Supports Greenhouse Gas Regulation**

The DAQ public notice interprets the recent Supreme Court decision as “the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for the purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit.” However, this is incorrect. What the Supreme Court did say is:

Holding: The Clean Air Act neither compels nor permits the Environmental Protection Agency to adopt an interpretation of the Clean Air Act requiring a stationary source of pollution to obtain a "Prevention of Significant

<sup>1</sup> *Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA*, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 189 L. Ed. 2d 372, 78 ERC 1585 (2014)

<sup>2</sup> NCGS 150B-19.3(a)

Deterioration" or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emission. However, EPA reasonably interpreted the Clean Air Act to require sources that would need permits based on their emission of conventional pollutants to comply with "best available control technology" for greenhouse gases.<sup>3</sup>

Emphasis added. The Court did acknowledge that greenhouse gases constitute pollutants under the Clean Air Act's definition of air pollutants, and that the Environmental Protection Agency acted within its authority when it issued a rule requiring stationary sources to comply with best available control technology requirements (BACT) for greenhouse gas emissions before obtaining prevention of significant deterioration (PSD) permits. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote:

(b) EPA's decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under *Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U. S. 837. The specific phrasing of the BACT provision—which requires BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act, §7475(a)(4)—does not suggest that the provision can bear a narrowing construction. And even if the text were not clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to make EPA's interpretation unreasonable.<sup>4</sup>

So, in order to obtain PSD permits, air pollution sources must be subject to best available control technology for greenhouse gases, controls which are not limited to carbon capture and include measures such as efficiency and performance standards to limit carbon dioxide from power plants, cement kilns and other major emitters which are responsible for over 80% of the greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources. Although EPA may not require BACT for sources that emit *de minimis* amounts of greenhouse gases, the Clean Air Act is unambiguous: greenhouse gases are properly subject to limitation under BACT and PSD.

### Primacy

With its recent decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group*, the Supreme Court has established a trifecta for EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. In 2007, the court held that carbon dioxide and other global warming gases are pollutants.<sup>5</sup> In 2011, the Court confirmed EPA's ability to issue performance standards to limit carbon dioxide emissions from electric power plants and other major sources.<sup>6</sup> Through the series of decisions the EPA has established the critical need for greenhouse gas reductions, the authority to set performance standards for power plants and other major sources, and confirmed that the Clean Air Act's requirement of BACT for PSD permits.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/utility-air-regulatory-group-v-environmental-protection-agency/>

<sup>4</sup> *Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA* at 3

<sup>5</sup> *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 US 497 (2007)

<sup>6</sup> *American Electric Power v. Connecticut*, 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011)

2014

As an agreement state, North Carolina must now implement the provisions of the federal Clean Air Act to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Its primary enforcement authority—primacy—does not allow the Division of Air Quality to issue permits which do not conform to the minimums of federal regulations and does not allow the Environmental Management Commission to adopt rules less stringent than federal law. Nor does the General Assembly's limitation on certain environmental rules under NCGS 150B-19.3 sanction the adoption of substandard regulations. There is a floor established by the federal statutes below which no state may go. But laws preventing stricter standards are a common feature, particularly in EPA Region 4.

Many primacy states have adopted laws requiring that their state environmental protection agencies not promulgate rules that exceed EPA standards, a practice that seems inconsistent with the view that states assume primacy in order to regulate environmental polluters forcefully.<sup>7</sup>

What was the legislative intent of the "Limitation on certain environmental rules," NCGS 150B-19.3? Was it the greater protection of the health and welfare of state residents? Or was it for the benefit of the Utility Air Regulatory Group, which counts among its members Duke Energy Progress, Dominion North Carolina Power, and scores of other industries to whom relaxed environmental rules and streamlined permitting are like money in the bank. For the rest of us, federal regulatory control may indeed be advantageous:

...several studies have found that federal agencies across a variety of policy fields are more stringent enforcers than state agencies in states that have primacy and that state agencies are more responsive to the demands for lax enforcement emanating from industrial polluters within the state.<sup>8</sup>

### Conclusion

The Supreme Court has provided the DAQ with a map for greenhouse gas reductions. The North Carolina Constitution states: "It shall be the policy of this State...to control and limit the pollution of our air and water..."<sup>9</sup> The Blue Ridge Environmental Defense League opposes even temporary relaxation of the rules.

Respectfully,



Louis A. Zeller, Executive Director

<sup>7</sup> Woods ND, "Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy in the U. S. States," *Publius*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (Spring 2006) p. 263, Oxford University Press, Accessed 30/9/2014  
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/4624744>

<sup>8</sup> *Id.*

<sup>9</sup> N.C. Constitution, Article XIV, Section 5

Carolina Cellulosic Biofuels llc,  
1979 Eastwood Road, Wilmington NC, 28403  
*A Massi Ghisolfi Company*

October 6, 2014

Ms. Joelle Burleson  
Division of Air Quality  
1641 Mail Service Center  
Raleigh, NC 27699-1641

**Subject: Proposed Modifications to North Carolina PSD Rules for Greenhouse Gases**

Dear Ms. Burleson:

Chemtex International (Chemtex, d/b/a Carolina Cellulosic Ethanol) strongly supports efforts by the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission (EMC) to revise the North Carolina Division of Air Quality's (DAQ's) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) preconstruction permitting regulations of 15A NCAC 02D.0544. As currently written, these regulations establish requirements that require undergo the lengthy PSD preconstruction permitting process for projects solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. On June 23, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had overstepped its authority under the Clean Air Act to require that projects undergo PSD review solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. Since DAQ's regulations requiring projects to undergo PSD review was based in its entirety upon EPA's regulations that the Supreme Court has found invalid, it is incumbent upon the EMC implement changes to its corresponding regulations.

Chemtex is planning to construct a manufacturing facility that will produce advanced biofuels in Sampson County, North Carolina. This facility will process energy crops of cellulosic materials and agricultural residues, which will be primarily grown in nearby agricultural areas to produce approximately 20 million gallons per year of ethanol and will help to meet goals established under the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standards (RFS). This project will provide approximately 65 direct and 300 indirect jobs in the area of Sampson County.


Chemtex received a permit to construct the biofuels facility from the DAQ prior to the effective date of the current DAQ rules for GHG emissions. In the coming weeks, Chemtex (that so far has spent in developing this project approximately \$4 mil), anticipates the closing for the remaining \$200 mil required to build and start the facility and a quick ramp up of the construction schedule. Since the original time of permitting, Chemtex has determined that certain revisions to the original project design are necessary. After consultation with the DAQ, Chemtex has learned that any application submitted at this time must be processed in accordance with the current DAQ regulations, which would trigger PSD review solely on the basis of GHG emissions, resulting in an untenable delay in construction. Based on the current timetable for completion of the project, the project is eligible for important financial state incentives that are linked to completion of the construction and operation of the facility on a timeline that cannot be met if the project undergoes PSD review. Such a delay would likely result in a loss of financial support for the

Carolina Cellulosic Biofuels llc,  
1979 Eastwood Road, Wilmington NC, 28403  
*A Mossi Ghisolfi Company*

project, since investors and lenders would not only have to put on hold the financial closing for an undefined term, but would also lose access to incentives program that have a pre-defined sunset date.

In closing, we appeal to the EMC and DAQ to expedite passage of the proposed temporary rule to align DAQ rules with the recent Supreme Court decision. The decision is not only important to Chemtex's business interests, but also to the citizens of North Carolina and the U.S. as Chemtex demonstrates that its technology will play an integral role of nationwide efforts to meet the U.S. RFS.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "Paolo Carollo", written in a cursive style.

Paolo Carollo  
Director

Carolina Cellulosic Biofuels, LLC



October 8, 2014

Ms. Joelle Burleson  
Division of Air Quality  
1641 Mail Service Center  
Raleigh, NC 27699-1641

**Subject: Proposed Modifications to North Carolina PSD Rules for Greenhouse Gases**

Dear Ms. Burleson:

Coastal Carolina Clean Power strongly supports efforts by the North Carolina Environmental Management Commission (EMC) to revise the North Carolina Division of Air Quality's (DAQ's) Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) preconstruction permitting regulations of 15A NCAC 02D.0544. As currently written, these regulations establish requirements that require we undergo the lengthy PSD preconstruction permitting process for projects solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. On June 23, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency had overstepped its authority under the Clean Air Act to require that projects undergo PSD review solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. Since DAQ's regulations requiring projects to undergo PSD review was based in its entirety upon EPA's regulations that the Supreme Court has found invalid, it is incumbent upon the EMC to implement changes to its corresponding regulations.

In closing, we appeal to the EMC and DAQ to expedite passage of the proposed temporary rule to align DAQ rules with the recent Supreme Court decision. By supporting this change to conform to the US Supreme Court Ruling any future permit modifications by our company would not trigger PSD based solely on GHG emissions.

Sincerely,  
COASTAL CAROLINA CLEAN POWER

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'K. Michael', is written over the printed name.

Kyle Michael  
Facility Manager

KM:mem

Gil Vinzani, Piedmont Natural Gas Company (transcribed from public hearing audio recording)

We are probably the largest local distribution pipeline company within North Carolina. We also have some service territory in Tennessee and South Carolina. In North Carolina, we have three Title V permits. One of them is located in Lumberton. This Title V permit, which we got just last year, is one of those that would not be a Title V except for greenhouse gases. We do have the Title V now, but if this pending rule and the Supreme Court decision had been earlier, we may not have had to have a Title V permit. I just wanted to ask the question if there will be an opportunity for those types of facilities that are directly affected to go back and get a synthetic minor type of permit instead of a PSD Title V type permit.

Thank you. I would like to go on record that we do support the proposed rule.

## CHAPTER VI

## INDEX OF ATTACHMENTS

<u>ATTACHMENTS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency	VI-2
July 24, 2014 EPA Memorandum: Next Steps and Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Act Permitting Programs to Greenhouse Gases Following the Supreme Court's Decision	VI-54

(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2013

1

## Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See *United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co.*, 200 U. S. 321, 337.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

## Syllabus

**UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP *v.*  
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY ET AL.**

**CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR  
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT**

No. 12–1146. Argued February 24, 2014—Decided June 23, 2014 \*

The Clean Air Act imposes permitting requirements on stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants. The Act’s “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD) provisions make it unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [the PSD program] applies” without a permit. §§7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). A “major emitting facility” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain types of sources). §7479(1). Facilities seeking to qualify for a PSD permit must, *inter alia*, comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act. §7475(a)(4). In addition, Title V of the Act makes it unlawful to operate any “major source,” wherever located, without a permit. §7661a(a). A “major source” is a stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant.” §§7661(2)(B), 7602(j).

In response to *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U. S. 497, EPA promulgated greenhouse-gas emission standards for new motor vehicles, and

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\*Together with No. 12–1248, *American Chemistry Council et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.*, No. 12–1254, *Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.*, No. 12–1268, *Southeastern Legal Foundation, Inc., et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.*, No. 12–1269, *Texas et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.*, and No. 12–1272, *Chamber of Commerce of United States States et al. v. Environmental Protection Agency et al.*, also on certiorari to the same court.

## Syllabus

made stationary sources subject to the PSD program and Title V on the basis of their potential to emit greenhouse gases. It recognized, however, that requiring permits for all sources with greenhouse-gas emissions above the statutory thresholds would radically expand those programs and render them unadministrable. So EPA purported to “tailor” the programs to accommodate greenhouse gases by providing, among other things, that sources would not become newly subject to PSD or Title V permitting on the basis of their potential to emit greenhouse gases in amounts less than 100,000 tons per year.

Numerous parties, including several States, challenged EPA’s actions in the D. C. Circuit, which dismissed some of the petitions for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder.

*Held:* The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

684 F. 3d 102, affirmed in part and reversed in part.

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, concluding:

1. The Act neither compels nor permits EPA to adopt an interpretation of the Act requiring a source to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions. Pp. 10–24.

(a) The Act does not compel EPA’s interpretation. *Massachusetts* held that the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse gases, 549 U. S., at 529, but where the term “air pollutant” appears in the Act’s operative provisions, including the PSD and Title V permitting provisions, EPA has routinely given it a narrower, context-appropriate meaning. *Massachusetts* did not invalidate those longstanding constructions. The Act-wide definition is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may consider regulating under the Act’s operative provisions. Though Congress’s profligate use of “air pollutant” is not conducive to clarity, the presumption of consistent usage “readily yields” to context, and a statutory term “may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.” *Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.*, 549 U. S. 561, 574. Pp. 10–16.

(b) Nor does the Act permit EPA’s interpretation. Agencies empowered to resolve statutory ambiguities must operate “within the bounds of reasonable interpretation,” *Arlington v. FCC*, 569 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_. EPA has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with the Act’s structure and design. A review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy sub-

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

3

## Syllabus

stantive and procedural burdens. EPA’s interpretation would also bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U. S. 120, 160. Pp. 16–20.

(c) EPA lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical thresholds of 100 or 250 tons per year to accommodate its greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the permitting triggers. Agencies must always “give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” *National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 551 U. S. 644, 665. The power to execute the laws does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice. Pp. 20–24.

2. EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require sources that would need permits based on their emission of conventional pollutants to comply with BACT for greenhouse gases. Pp. 24–29.

(a) Concerns that BACT, which has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls, is fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse-gas regulation, which is more about energy use, are not unfounded. But an EPA guidance document states that BACT analysis should consider options other than energy efficiency, including “carbon capture and storage,” which EPA contends is reasonably comparable to more traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies. Moreover, assuming that BACT may be used to force improvements in energy efficiency, important limitations on BACT may work to mitigate concerns about “unbounded” regulatory authority. Pp. 24–27.

(b) EPA’s decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under *Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U. S. 837. The specific phrasing of the BACT provision—which requires BACT “for each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act, §7475(a)(4)—does not suggest that the provision can bear a narrowing construction. And even if the text were not clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to make EPA’s interpretation unreasonable. Pp. 27–29.

SCALIA, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion, Parts I and II of which were for the Court. ROBERTS, C. J., and KENNEDY, J., joined that opinion in full; THOMAS and ALITO, JJ., joined as to Parts I, II–A, and II–B–1; and GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined as to Part II–B–2. BREYER J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which GINSBURG, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, in which THOMAS, J., joined.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

1

## Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

Nos. 12–1146, 12–1248, 12–1254, 12–1268, 12–1269, and 12–1272

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,  
PETITIONER

12–1146

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,  
PETITIONERS

12–1248

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

ENERGY-INTENSIVE MANUFACTURERS WORKING  
GROUP ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1254

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1268

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1269

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,  
ET AL.; AND

2

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP *v.* EPA

Opinion of the Court

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED  
STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1272

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2014]

JUSTICE SCALIA announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II.

Acting pursuant to the Clean Air Act, 69 Stat. 322, as amended, 42 U. S. C. §§7401–7671q, the Environmental Protection Agency recently set standards for emissions of “greenhouse gases” (substances it believes contribute to “global climate change”) from new motor vehicles. We must decide whether it was permissible for EPA to determine that its motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas regulations automatically triggered permitting requirements under the Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.

## I. Background

## A. Stationary-Source Permitting

The Clean Air Act regulates pollution-generating emissions from both stationary sources, such as factories and powerplants, and moving sources, such as cars, trucks, and aircraft. This litigation concerns permitting obligations imposed on stationary sources under Titles I and V of the Act.

Title I charges EPA with formulating national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) for air pollutants. §§7408–7409. To date, EPA has issued NAAQS for six pollutants: sulfur dioxide, particulate matter, nitrogen dioxide, carbon monoxide, ozone, and lead. Clean Air Act Handbook 125 (J. Domike & A. Zacaroli eds., 3d ed. 2011); see generally 40 CFR pt. 50 (2013). States have primary responsibility

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

3

## Opinion of the Court

for implementing the NAAQS by developing “State implementation plans.” 42 U. S. C. §7410. A State must designate every area within its borders as “attainment,” “non-attainment,” or “unclassifiable” with respect to each NAAQS, §7407(d), and the State’s implementation plan must include permitting programs for stationary sources that vary according to the classification of the area where the source is or is proposed to be located. §7410(a)(2)(C), (I).

Stationary sources in areas designated attainment or unclassifiable are subject to the Act’s provisions relating to “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD). §§7470–7492. EPA interprets the PSD provisions to apply to sources located in areas that are designated attainment or unclassifiable for *any* NAAQS pollutant, regardless of whether the source emits that specific pollutant. Since the inception of the PSD program, every area of the country has been designated attainment or unclassifiable for at least one NAAQS pollutant; thus, on EPA’s view, all stationary sources are potentially subject to PSD review.

It is unlawful to construct or modify a “major emitting facility” in “any area to which [the PSD program] applies” without first obtaining a permit. §§7475(a)(1), 7479(2)(C). To qualify for a permit, the facility must not cause or contribute to the violation of any applicable air-quality standard, §7475(a)(3), and it must comply with emissions limitations that reflect the “best available control technology” (or BACT) for “each pollutant subject to regulation under” the Act. §7475(a)(4). The Act defines a “major emitting facility” as any stationary source with the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any air pollutant” (or 100 tons per year for certain types of sources). §7479(1). It defines “modification” as a physical or operational change that causes the facility to emit more of “any air pollutant.”

## Opinion of the Court

§7411(a)(4).<sup>1</sup>

In addition to the PSD permitting requirements for construction and modification, Title V of the Act makes it unlawful to *operate* any “major source,” wherever located, without a comprehensive operating permit. §7661a(a). Unlike the PSD program, Title V generally does not impose any substantive pollution-control requirements. Instead, it is designed to facilitate compliance and enforcement by consolidating into a single document all of a facility’s obligations under the Act. The permit must include all “emissions limitations and standards” that apply to the source, as well as associated inspection, monitoring, and reporting requirements. §7661c(a)–(c). Title V defines a “major source” by reference to the Act-wide definition of “major stationary source,” which in turn means any stationary source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant.” §§7661(2)(B), 7602(j).

## B. EPA’s Greenhouse-Gas Regulations

In 2007, the Court held that Title II of the Act “authorize[d] EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles” if the Agency “form[ed] a ‘judgment’ that

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<sup>1</sup>Although the statute sets numerical thresholds (100 or 250 tons per year) for emissions that will make a facility “major,” it does not specify by how much a physical or operational change must increase emissions to constitute a permit-requiring “modification.” Nor does it say how much of a given regulated pollutant a “major emitting facility” must emit before it is subject to BACT for that pollutant. EPA, however, has established pollutant-specific numerical thresholds below which a facility’s emissions of a pollutant, and increases therein, are considered *de minimis* for those purposes. See 40 CFR §§51.166(b)(2)(i), (23), (39), (j)(2)–(3), 52.21(b)(2)(i), (23), (40), (j)(2)–(3); see also *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, 636 F. 2d 323, 360–361, 400, 405 (CA DC 1979) (recognizing this authority in EPA); cf. *Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. William Wrigley, Jr., Co.*, 505 U. S. 214, 231 (1992) (“[D]e minimis non curat lex . . . is part of the established background of legal principles against which all enactments are adopted”).

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

5

## Opinion of the Court

such emissions contribute to climate change.” *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U. S. 497, 528 (quoting §7521(a)(1)). In response to that decision, EPA embarked on a course of regulation resulting in “the single largest expansion in the scope of the [Act] in its history.” Clean Air Act Handbook, at xxi.

EPA first asked the public, in a notice of proposed rulemaking, to comment on how the Agency should respond to *Massachusetts*. In doing so, it explained that regulating greenhouse-gas emissions from motor vehicles could have far-reaching consequences for stationary sources. Under EPA’s view, once greenhouse gases became regulated under any part of the Act, the PSD and Title V permitting requirements would apply to all stationary sources with the potential to emit greenhouse gases in excess of the statutory thresholds: 100 tons per year under Title V, and 100 or 250 tons per year under the PSD program depending on the type of source. 73 Fed. Reg. 44420, 44498, 44511 (2008). Because greenhouse-gas emissions tend to be “orders of magnitude greater” than emissions of conventional pollutants, EPA projected that numerous small sources not previously regulated under the Act would be swept into the PSD program and Title V, including “smaller industrial sources,” “large office and residential buildings, hotels, large retail establishments, and similar facilities.” *Id.*, at 44498–44499. The Agency warned that this would constitute an “unprecedented expansion of EPA authority that would have a profound effect on virtually every sector of the economy and touch every household in the land,” yet still be “relatively ineffective at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations.” *Id.*, at 44355.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Comments from other Executive Branch agencies reprinted in the notice echoed those concerns. See, e.g., 73 Fed. Reg. 44360 (Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Energy noting EPA would “exercis[e] de facto zoning authority through control over thousands of what formerly were local or private decisions, impacting

## Opinion of the Court

In 2009, EPA announced its determination regarding the danger posed by motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas emissions. EPA found that greenhouse-gas emissions from new motor vehicles contribute to elevated atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, which endanger public health and welfare by fostering global “climate change.” 74 Fed. Reg. 66523, 66537 (hereinafter Endangerment Finding). It denominated a “single air pollutant” the “combined mix” of six greenhouse gases that it identified as “the root cause of human-induced climate change”: carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. *Id.*, at 66516, 66537. A source’s greenhouse-gas emissions would be measured in “carbon dioxide equivalent units” (CO<sub>2</sub>e), which would be calculated based on each gas’s “global warming potential.” *Id.*, at 66499, n. 4.

Next, EPA issued its “final decision” regarding the prospect that motor-vehicle greenhouse-gas standards would trigger stationary-source permitting requirements. 75 Fed. Reg. 17004 (2010) (hereinafter Triggering Rule). EPA announced that beginning on the effective date of its greenhouse-gas standards for motor vehicles, stationary sources would be subject to the PSD program and Title V on the basis of their potential to emit greenhouse gases. As expected, EPA in short order promulgated greenhouse-gas emission standards for passenger cars, light-duty

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the construction of schools, hospitals, and commercial and residential development”); *id.*, at 44383 (Council of Economic Advisers and Office of Science and Technology Policy stating that “[s]mall manufacturing facilities, schools, and shopping centers” would be subject to “full major source permitting”); *id.*, at 44385 (Council on Environmental Quality noting “the prospect of essentially automatic and immediate regulation over a vast range of community and business activity”); *id.*, at 44391 (Small Business Administration finding it “difficult to overemphasize how potentially disruptive and burdensome such a new regulatory regime would be to small entities” such as “office buildings, retail establishments, hotels, . . . schools, prisons, and private hospitals”).

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

7

## Opinion of the Court

trucks, and medium-duty passenger vehicles to take effect on January 2, 2011. 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (hereinafter Tailpipe Rule).

EPA then announced steps it was taking to “tailor” the PSD program and Title V to greenhouse gases. 75 Fed. Reg. 31514 (hereinafter Tailoring Rule). Those steps were necessary, it said, because the PSD program and Title V were designed to regulate “a relatively small number of large industrial sources,” and requiring permits for all sources with greenhouse-gas emissions above the statutory thresholds would radically expand those programs, making them both unadministrable and “unrecognizable to the Congress that designed” them. *Id.*, at 31555, 31562. EPA nonetheless rejected calls to exclude greenhouse gases entirely from those programs, asserting that the Act is not “ambiguous with respect to the need to cover [greenhouse-gas] sources under either the PSD or title V program.” *Id.*, at 31548, n. 31. Instead, EPA adopted a “phase-in approach” that it said would “appl[y] PSD and title V at threshold levels that are as close to the statutory levels as possible, and do so as quickly as possible, at least to a certain point.” *Id.*, at 31523.

The phase-in, EPA said, would consist of at least three steps. During Step 1, from January 2 through June 30, 2011, no source would become newly subject to the PSD program or Title V solely on the basis of its greenhouse-gas emissions; however, sources required to obtain permits anyway because of their emission of conventional pollutants (so-called “anyway” sources) would need to comply with BACT for greenhouse gases if they emitted those gases in significant amounts, defined as at least 75,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e. *Ibid.* During Step 2, from July 1, 2011, through June 30, 2012, sources with the potential to emit at least 100,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e of greenhouse gases would be subject to PSD and Title V permitting for their construction and operation and to PSD permitting

## Opinion of the Court

for modifications that would increase their greenhouse-gas emissions by at least 75,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e. *Id.*, at 31523–31524.<sup>3</sup> At Step 3, beginning on July 1, 2013, EPA said it might (or might not) further reduce the permitting thresholds (though not below 50,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e), and it might (or might not) establish permanent exemptions for some sources. *Id.*, at 31524. Beyond Step 3, EPA promised to complete another round of rulemaking by April 30, 2016, in which it would “take further action to address small sources,” which might (or might not) include establishing permanent exemptions. *Id.*, at 31525.

EPA codified Steps 1 and 2 at 40 CFR §§51.166(b)(48) and 52.21(b)(49) for PSD and at §§70.2 and 71.2 for Title V, and it codified its commitments regarding Step 3 and beyond at §§52.22, 70.12, and 71.13. See Tailoring Rule 31606–31608. After the decision below, EPA issued its final Step 3 rule, in which it decided not to lower the thresholds it had established at Step 2 until at least 2016. 77 Fed. Reg. 41051 (2012).

## C. Decision Below

Numerous parties, including several States, filed petitions for review in the D. C. Circuit under 42 U. S. C. §7607(b), challenging EPA’s greenhouse-gas-related actions. The Court of Appeals dismissed some of the petitions for lack of jurisdiction and denied the remainder. *Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA*, 684 F. 3d 102 (2012) (*per curiam*). First, it upheld the Endangerment Finding and Tailpipe Rule. *Id.*, at 119, 126. Next, it held that EPA’s interpretation of the PSD permitting requirement as applying to “any regulated air pollu-

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<sup>3</sup>EPA stated that its adoption of a 75,000-tons-per-year threshold for emissions requiring BACT and modifications requiring permits was not an exercise of its authority to establish *de minimis* exceptions and that a truly *de minimis* level might be “well below” 75,000 tons per year. Tailoring Rule 31560; cf. n. 1, *supra*.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

9

## Opinion of the Court

tant,” including greenhouse gases, was “compelled by the statute.” *Id.*, at 133–134. The court also found it “crystal clear that PSD permittees must install BACT for greenhouse gases.” *Id.*, at 137. Because it deemed petitioners’ arguments about the PSD program insufficiently applicable to Title V, it held they had “forfeited any challenges to EPA’s greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation of Title V.” *Id.*, at 136. Finally, it held that petitioners were without Article III standing to challenge EPA’s efforts to limit the reach of the PSD program and Title V through the Triggering and Tailoring Rules. *Id.*, at 146. The court denied rehearing en banc, with Judges Brown and Kavanaugh each dissenting. No. 09–1322 etc. (Dec. 20, 2012), App. 139, 2012 WL 6621785.

We granted six petitions for certiorari but agreed to decide only one question: “Whether EPA permissibly determined that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary sources that emit greenhouse gases.” 571 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2013).

## II. Analysis

This litigation presents two distinct challenges to EPA’s stance on greenhouse-gas permitting for stationary sources. First, we must decide whether EPA permissibly determined that a source may be subject to the PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the sole basis of the source’s potential to emit greenhouse gases. Second, we must decide whether EPA permissibly determined that a source already subject to the PSD program because of its emission of conventional pollutants (an “anyway” source) may be required to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions by employing the “best available control technology” for greenhouse gases. The Solicitor General joins issue on both points but evidently regards the second as more important; he informs us that “anyway” sources account

## Opinion of the Court

for roughly 83% of American stationary-source greenhouse-gas emissions, compared to just 3% for the additional, non-“anyway” sources EPA sought to regulate at Steps 2 and 3 of the Tailoring Rule. Tr. of Oral Arg. 52.

We review EPA’s interpretations of the Clean Air Act using the standard set forth in *Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U. S. 837, 842–843 (1984). Under *Chevron*, we presume that when an agency-administered statute is ambiguous with respect to what it prescribes, Congress has empowered the agency to resolve the ambiguity. The question for a reviewing court is whether in doing so the agency has acted reasonably and thus has “stayed within the bounds of its statutory authority.” *Arlington v. FCC*, 569 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2013) (slip op., at 5) (emphasis deleted).

## A. The PSD and Title V Triggers

We first decide whether EPA permissibly interpreted the statute to provide that a source may be required to obtain a PSD or Title V permit on the sole basis of its potential greenhouse-gas emissions.

## 1

EPA thought its conclusion that a source’s greenhouse-gas emissions may necessitate a PSD or Title V permit followed from the Act’s unambiguous language. The Court of Appeals agreed and held that the statute “compelled” EPA’s interpretation. 684 F. 3d, at 134. We disagree. The statute compelled EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation with respect to neither the PSD program nor Title V.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>The Court of Appeals held that petitioners’ arguments applied only to the PSD program and that petitioners had therefore “forfeited any challenges to EPA’s greenhouse gas-inclusive interpretation of Title V.” 684 F. 3d, at 136. The Solicitor General does not defend the Court of Appeals’ ruling on forfeiture, and he concedes that some of the argu-

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

11

## Opinion of the Court

The Court of Appeals reasoned by way of a flawed syllogism: Under *Massachusetts*, the general, Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse gases; the Act requires permits for major emitters of “any air pollutant”; therefore, the Act requires permits for major emitters of greenhouse gases. The conclusion follows from the premises only if the air pollutants referred to in the permit-requiring provisions (the minor premise) are the same air pollutants encompassed by the Act-wide definition as interpreted in *Massachusetts* (the major premise). Yet no one—least of all EPA—endorses that proposition, and it is obviously untenable.

The Act-wide definition says that an air pollutant is “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, [or] radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.” §7602(g). In *Massachusetts*, the Court held that the Act-wide definition includes greenhouse gases because it is all-encompassing; it “embraces all airborne compounds of whatever stripe.” 549 U. S., at 529. But where the term “air pollutant” appears in the Act’s operative provisions, EPA has routinely given it a narrower, context-appropriate meaning.

That is certainly true of the provisions that require PSD and Title V permitting for major emitters of “any air pollutant.” Since 1978, EPA’s regulations have interpreted “air pollutant” in the PSD permitting trigger as limited to *regulated* air pollutants, 43 Fed. Reg. 26403, codified, as amended, 40 CFR §52.21(b)(1)–(2), (50)—a class much narrower than *Massachusetts*’ “all airborne compounds of

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ments petitioners have made before this Court apply to Title V as well as the PSD program. See Brief for Federal Respondents 56. We agree, and we are satisfied that those arguments were also made below. See, e.g., Brief for State Petitioners et al. in No. 10–1073 etc. (CADDC), pp. 59–73; Brief for Non-State Petitioners et al. in No. 10–1073 etc. (CADDC), pp. 46–47.

## Opinion of the Court

whatever stripe,” 549 U. S., at 529. And since 1993 EPA has informally taken the same position with regard to the Title V permitting trigger, a position the Agency ultimately incorporated into some of the regulations at issue here. See Memorandum from Lydia N. Wegman, Deputy Director, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards, to Air Division Director, Regions I–X, pp. 4–5 (Apr. 26, 1993); Tailoring Rule 31607–31608 (amending 40 CFR §§70.2, 71.2). Those interpretations were appropriate: It is plain as day that the Act does not envision an elaborate, burdensome permitting process for major emitters of steam, oxygen, or other harmless airborne substances. It takes some cheek for EPA to insist that it cannot possibly give “air pollutant” a reasonable, context-appropriate meaning in the PSD and Title V contexts when it has been doing precisely that for decades.

Nor are those the only places in the Act where EPA has inferred from statutory context that a generic reference to air pollutants does not encompass every substance falling within the Act-wide definition. Other examples abound:

- The Act authorizes EPA to enforce new source performance standards (NSPS) against a pre-existing source if, after promulgation of the standards, the source undergoes a physical or operational change that increases its emission of “any air pollutant.” §7411(a)(2), (4), (b)(1)(B). EPA interprets that provision as limited to air pollutants *for which EPA has promulgated new source performance standards*. 36 Fed. Reg. 24877 (1971), codified, as amended, 40 CFR §60.2; 40 Fed. Reg. 58419 (1975), codified, as amended, 40 CFR §60.14(a).
- The Act requires a permit for the construction or operation in a nonattainment area of a source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

13

## Opinion of the Court

pollutant.” §§7502(c)(5), 7602(j). EPA interprets that provision as limited to pollutants *for which the area is designated nonattainment*. 45 Fed. Reg. 52745 (1980), promulgating 40 CFR §51.18(j)(2), as amended, §51.165(a)(2).

- The Act directs EPA to require “enhanced monitoring and submission of compliance certifications” for any source with the potential to emit 100 tons per year of “any air pollutant.” §§7414(a)(3), 7602(j). EPA interprets that provision as limited to *regulated* pollutants. 62 Fed. Reg. 54941 (1997), codified at 40 CFR §§64.1, 64.2.
- The Act requires certain sources of air pollutants that interfere with visibility to undergo retrofitting if they have the potential to emit 250 tons per year of “any pollutant.” §7491(b)(2)(A), (g)(7). EPA interprets that provision as limited to *visibility-impairing* air pollutants. 70 Fed. Reg. 39160 (2005), codified at 40 CFR pt. 51, App. Y, §II.A.3.

Although these limitations are nowhere to be found in the Act-wide definition, in each instance EPA has concluded—as it has in the PSD and Title V context—that the statute is not using “air pollutant” in *Massachusetts*’ broad sense to mean any airborne substance whatsoever.

*Massachusetts* did not invalidate all these longstanding constructions. That case did not hold that EPA must always regulate greenhouse gases as an “air pollutant” everywhere that term appears in the statute, but only that EPA must “ground its reasons for action *or* inaction in the statute,” 549 U. S., at 535 (emphasis added), rather than on “reasoning divorced from the statutory text,” *id.*, at 532. EPA’s inaction with regard to Title II was not sufficiently grounded in the statute, the Court said, in part

## Opinion of the Court

because nothing in the Act suggested that regulating greenhouse gases under that Title would conflict with the statutory design. Title II would not compel EPA to regulate in any way that would be “extreme,” “counterintuitive,” or contrary to “common sense.” *Id.*, at 531. At most, it would require EPA to take the modest step of adding greenhouse-gas standards to the roster of new-motor-vehicle emission regulations. *Ibid.*

*Massachusetts* does not strip EPA of authority to exclude greenhouse gases from the class of regulable air pollutants under other parts of the Act where their inclusion would be inconsistent with the statutory scheme. The Act-wide definition to which the Court gave a “sweeping” and “capacious” interpretation, *id.*, at 528, 532, is not a command to regulate, but a description of the universe of substances EPA may *consider* regulating under the Act’s operative provisions. *Massachusetts* does not foreclose the Agency’s use of statutory context to infer that certain of the Act’s provisions use “air pollutant” to denote not every conceivable airborne substance, but only those that may sensibly be encompassed within the particular regulatory program. As certain *amici* felicitously put it, while *Massachusetts* “rejected EPA’s categorical contention that greenhouse gases *could not* be ‘air pollutants’ for any purposes of the Act,” it did not “embrace EPA’s current, equally categorical position that greenhouse gases *must* be air pollutants for all purposes” regardless of the statutory context. Brief for Administrative Law Professors et al. as *Amici Curiae* 17.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>Our decision in *American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut*, 564 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2011), does not suggest otherwise. We there held that the Act’s authorization for EPA to establish performance standards for power-plant greenhouse-gas emissions displaced any federal-common-law right that might otherwise have existed to seek abatement of those emissions. *Id.*, at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 10). The authorization to which we referred was that given in the NSPS program of §7411, a part of the Act

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

15

## Opinion of the Court

To be sure, Congress’s profligate use of “air pollutant” where what is meant is obviously narrower than the Act-wide definition is not conducive to clarity. One ordinarily assumes “that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.” *Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp.*, 549 U. S. 561, 574 (2007). In this respect (as in countless others), the Act is far from a *chef d’oeuvre* of legislative draftsmanship. But we, and EPA, must do our best, bearing in mind the “fundamental canon of statutory construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” *FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.*, 529 U. S. 120, 133 (2000). As we reiterated the same day we decided *Massachusetts*, the presumption of consistent usage “readily yields” to context, and a statutory term—even one defined in the statute—“may take on distinct characters from association with distinct statutory objects calling for different implementation strategies.” *Duke Energy, supra*, at 574.

We need not, and do not, pass on the validity of all the limiting constructions EPA has given the term “air pollutant” throughout the Act. We merely observe that taken together, they belie EPA’s rigid insistence that when interpreting the PSD and Title V permitting requirements it is bound by the Act-wide definition’s inclusion of greenhouse gases, no matter how incompatible that inclusion is with those programs’ regulatory structure.

In sum, there is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical

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not at issue here and one that no party in *American Electric Power* argued was ill suited to accommodating greenhouse gases.

## Opinion of the Court

pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written.<sup>6</sup>

## 2

Having determined that EPA was mistaken in thinking the Act *compelled* a greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers, we next consider the Agency’s alternative position that its interpretation was justified as an exercise of its “discretion” to adopt “a reasonable construction of the statute.” Tailoring Rule 31517. We conclude that EPA’s interpretation is not permissible.

Even under *Chevron*’s deferential framework, agencies must operate “within the bounds of reasonable interpretation.” *Arlington*, 569 U. S., at \_\_\_ (slip op., at 5). And reasonable statutory interpretation must account for both “the specific context in which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the statute as a whole.” *Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.*, 519 U. S. 337, 341 (1997). A statutory

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<sup>6</sup>During the course of this litigation, several possible limiting constructions for the PSD trigger have been proposed. Judge Kavanaugh argued below that it would be plausible for EPA to read “any air pollutant” in the PSD context as limited to the six NAAQS pollutants. See *Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA*, No. 09–1322 etc. (CADC, Dec. 20, 2012), App. 171–180, 2012 WL 6621785, \*15–\*18 (opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Some petitioners make a slightly different argument: that because PSD permitting is required only for major emitting facilities “in any area to which [the PSD program] applies,” §7475(a), the relevant pollutants are only those NAAQS pollutants for which the area in question is designated attainment or unclassifiable. That approach would bring EPA’s interpretation of the PSD trigger in line with its longstanding interpretation of the permitting requirements for nonattainment areas. Others maintain that “any air pollutant” in the PSD provision should be limited to air pollutants with localized effects on air quality. We do not foreclose EPA or the courts from considering those constructions in the future, but we need not do so today.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

17

## Opinion of the Court

“provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.” *United Sav. Assn. of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd.*, 484 U. S. 365, 371 (1988). Thus, an agency interpretation that is “inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as a whole,” *University of Tex. Southwestern Medical Center v. Nassar*, 570 U. S. \_\_\_, \_\_\_ (2013) (slip op., at 13), does not merit deference.

EPA itself has repeatedly acknowledged that applying the PSD and Title V permitting requirements to greenhouse gases would be inconsistent with—in fact, would overthrow—the Act’s structure and design. In the Tailoring Rule, EPA described the calamitous consequences of interpreting the Act in that way. Under the PSD program, annual permit applications would jump from about 800 to nearly 82,000; annual administrative costs would swell from \$12 million to over \$1.5 billion; and decade-long delays in issuing permits would become common, causing construction projects to grind to a halt nationwide. Tailoring Rule 31557. The picture under Title V was equally bleak: The number of sources required to have permits would jump from fewer than 15,000 to about 6.1 million; annual administrative costs would balloon from \$62 million to \$21 billion; and collectively the newly covered sources would face permitting costs of \$147 billion. *Id.*, at 31562–31563. Moreover, “the great majority of additional sources brought into the PSD and title V programs would be small sources that Congress did not expect would need to undergo permitting.” *Id.*, at 31533. EPA stated that these results would be so “contrary to congressional intent,” and would so “severely undermine what Congress sought to accomplish,” that they necessitated as much as a 1,000-fold increase in the permitting thresholds set forth in the statute. *Id.*, at 31554, 31562.

## Opinion of the Court

Like EPA, we think it beyond reasonable debate that requiring permits for sources based solely on their emission of greenhouse gases at the 100- and 250-tons-per-year levels set forth in the statute would be “incompatible” with “the substance of Congress’ regulatory scheme.” *Brown & Williamson*, 529 U. S., at 156. A brief review of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.

Start with the PSD program, which imposes numerous and costly requirements on those sources that are required to apply for permits. Among other things, the applicant must make available a detailed scientific analysis of the source’s potential pollution-related impacts, demonstrate that the source will not contribute to the violation of any applicable pollution standard, and identify and use the “best available control technology” for each regulated pollutant it emits. §7475(a)(3), (4), (6), (e). The permitting authority (the State, usually) also bears its share of the burden: It must grant or deny a permit within a year, during which time it must hold a public hearing on the application. §7475(a)(2), (c). Not surprisingly, EPA acknowledges that PSD review is a “complicated, resource-intensive, time-consuming, and sometimes contentious process” suitable for “hundreds of larger sources,” not “tens of thousands of smaller sources.” 74 Fed. Reg. 55304, 55321–55322.

Title V contains no comparable substantive requirements but imposes elaborate procedural mandates. It requires the applicant to submit, within a year of becoming subject to Title V, a permit application and a “compliance plan” describing how it will comply with “all applicable requirements” under the Act; to certify its compliance annually; and to submit to “inspection, entry, monitoring,

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

19

## Opinion of the Court

... and reporting requirements.” §§7661b(b)–(c), 7661c(a)–(c). The procedural burdens on the permitting authority and EPA are also significant. The permitting authority must hold a public hearing on the application, §7661a(b)(6), and it must forward the application and any proposed permit to EPA and neighboring States and respond in writing to their comments, §7661d(a), (b)(1). If it fails to issue or deny the permit within 18 months, any interested party can sue to require a decision “without additional delay.” §§7661a(b)(7), 7661b(c). An interested party also can petition EPA to block issuance of the permit; EPA must grant or deny the petition within 60 days, and its decision may be challenged in federal court. §7661d(b)(2)–(3). As EPA wrote, Title V is “finely crafted for thousands,” not millions, of sources. Tailoring Rule 31563.

The fact that EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers would place plainly excessive demands on limited governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting it; but that is not the only reason. EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization. When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an unheralded power to regulate “a significant portion of the American economy,” *Brown & Williamson*, 529 U. S., at 159, we typically greet its announcement with a measure of skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an agency decisions of vast “economic and political significance.” *Id.*, at 160; see also *MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.*, 512 U. S. 218, 231 (1994); *Industrial Union Dept., AFL–CIO v. American Petroleum Institute*, 448 U. S. 607, 645–646 (1980) (plurality opinion). The power to require permits for the construction and modification of tens of thousands,

## Opinion of the Court

and the operation of millions, of small sources nationwide falls comfortably within the class of authorizations that we have been reluctant to read into ambiguous statutory text. Moreover, in EPA's assertion of that authority, we confront a singular situation: an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power over the national economy while at the same time strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would render the statute "unrecognizable to the Congress that designed" it. Tailoring Rule 31555. Since, as we hold above, the statute does not compel EPA's interpretation, it would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for EPA to insist on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not designed to grant.<sup>7</sup>

## 3

EPA thought that despite the foregoing problems, it could make its interpretation reasonable by adjusting the levels at which a source's greenhouse-gas emissions would

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<sup>7</sup>A few additional points bear mentioning. The Solicitor General conjectures that EPA might eventually alter its longstanding interpretation of "potential to emit" in order to reduce the number of sources required to have permits at the statutory thresholds. But neither he nor the Agency has given us any reason to believe that there exists a plausible reading of "potential to emit" that EPA would willingly adopt and that would eliminate the unreasonableness of EPA's interpretation. Nor have we been given any information about the ability of other possible "streamlining" techniques alluded to by EPA—such as "general" or "electronic" permitting—to reduce the administrability problems identified above; and in any event, none of those techniques would address the more fundamental problem of EPA's claiming regulatory authority over millions of small entities that it acknowledges the Act does not seek to regulate. Finally, the Solicitor General suggests that the incompatibility of greenhouse gases with the PSD program and Title V results chiefly from the inclusion of carbon dioxide in the "aggregate pollutant" defined by EPA. We decide these cases on the basis of the pollutant "greenhouse gases" as EPA has defined and regulated it, and we express no view on how our analysis might change were EPA to define it differently.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

21

## Opinion of the Court

oblige it to undergo PSD and Title V permitting. Although the Act, in no uncertain terms, requires permits for sources with the potential to emit more than 100 or 250 tons per year of a relevant pollutant, EPA in its Tailoring Rule wrote a new threshold of *100,000* tons per year for greenhouse gases. Since the Court of Appeals thought the statute unambiguously made greenhouse gases capable of triggering PSD and Title V, it held that petitioners lacked Article III standing to challenge the Tailoring Rule because that rule did not injure petitioners but merely relaxed the pre-existing statutory requirements. Because we, however, hold that EPA's greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the triggers was *not* compelled, and because EPA has essentially admitted that its interpretation would be unreasonable without "tailoring," we consider the validity of the Tailoring Rule.

We conclude that EPA's rewriting of the statutory thresholds was impermissible and therefore could not validate the Agency's interpretation of the triggering provisions. An agency has no power to "tailor" legislation to bureaucratic policy goals by rewriting unambiguous statutory terms. Agencies exercise discretion only in the interstices created by statutory silence or ambiguity; they must always "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." *National Assn. of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife*, 551 U. S. 644, 665 (2007) (quoting *Chevron*, 467 U. S., at 843). It is hard to imagine a statutory term less ambiguous than the precise numerical thresholds at which the Act requires PSD and Title V permitting. When EPA replaced those numbers with others of its own choosing, it went well beyond the "bounds of its statutory authority." *Arlington*, 569 U. S., at \_\_\_\_ (slip op., at 5) (emphasis deleted).

The Solicitor General does not, and cannot, defend the Tailoring Rule as an exercise of EPA's enforcement discretion. The Tailoring Rule is not just an announcement of

## Opinion of the Court

EPA’s refusal to enforce the statutory permitting requirements; it purports to *alter* those requirements and to establish with the force of law that otherwise-prohibited conduct will not violate the Act. This alteration of the statutory requirements was crucial to EPA’s “tailoring” efforts. Without it, small entities with the potential to emit greenhouse gases in amounts exceeding the statutory thresholds would have remained subject to citizen suits—authorized by the Act—to enjoin their construction, modification, or operation and to impose civil penalties of up to \$37,500 per day of violation. §§7413(b), 7604(a), (f)(4); 40 CFR §19.4. EPA itself has recently affirmed that the “independent enforcement authority” furnished by the citizen-suit provision cannot be displaced by a permitting authority’s decision not to pursue enforcement. 78 Fed. Reg. 12477, 12486–12487 (2013). The Solicitor General is therefore quite right to acknowledge that the availability of citizen suits made it necessary for EPA, in seeking to mitigate the unreasonableness of its greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation, to go beyond merely exercising its enforcement discretion. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 87–88.

For similar reasons, *Morton v. Ruiz*, 415 U. S. 199 (1974)—to which the Solicitor General points as the best case supporting the Tailoring Rule, see Tr. of Oral Arg. 71, 80–81—is irrelevant. In *Ruiz*, Congress had appropriated funds for the Bureau of Indian Affairs to spend on providing assistance to “Indians throughout the United States” and had not “impose[d] any geographical limitation on the availability of general assistance benefits.” *Id.*, at 206–207, and n. 7. Although we held the Bureau could not deny benefits to off-reservation Indians because it had not published its eligibility criteria, we stated in dictum that the Bureau could, if it followed proper administrative procedures, “create reasonable classifications and eligibility requirements in order to allocate the limited funds available.” *Id.*, at 230–231. That dictum stands only for

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

23

## Opinion of the Court

the unremarkable proposition that an agency may adopt policies to prioritize its expenditures *within the bounds established by Congress*. See also *Lincoln v. Vigil*, 508 U. S. 182, 192–193 (1993). Nothing in *Ruiz* remotely authorizes an agency to modify unambiguous requirements imposed by a federal statute. An agency confronting resource constraints may change its own conduct, but it cannot change the law.

Were we to recognize the authority claimed by EPA in the Tailoring Rule, we would deal a severe blow to the Constitution’s separation of powers. Under our system of government, Congress makes laws and the President, acting at times through agencies like EPA, “faithfully execute[s]” them. U. S. Const., Art. II, §3; see *Medellín v. Texas*, 552 U. S. 491, 526–527 (2008). The power of executing the laws necessarily includes both authority and responsibility to resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise during the law’s administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn out not to work in practice. See, e.g., *Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co.*, 534 U. S. 438, 462 (2002) (agency lacked authority “to develop new guidelines or to assign liability in a manner inconsistent with” an “unambiguous statute”).

In the Tailoring Rule, EPA asserts newfound authority to regulate millions of small sources—including retail stores, offices, apartment buildings, shopping centers, schools, and churches—and to decide, on an ongoing basis and without regard for the thresholds prescribed by Congress, how many of those sources to regulate. We are not willing to stand on the dock and wave goodbye as EPA embarks on this multiyear voyage of discovery. We reaffirm the core administrative-law principle that an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own sense of how the statute should operate. EPA therefore lacked authority to “tailor” the Act’s unambiguous numerical

## Opinion of the Court

thresholds to accommodate its greenhouse-gas-inclusive interpretation of the permitting triggers. Instead, the need to rewrite clear provisions of the statute should have alerted EPA that it had taken a wrong interpretive turn. Agencies are not free to “adopt . . . unreasonable interpretations of statutory provisions and then edit other statutory provisions to mitigate the unreasonableness.” App. 175, 2012 WL 6621785, \*16 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Because the Tailoring Rule cannot save EPA’s interpretation of the triggers, that interpretation was impermissible under *Chevron*.<sup>8</sup>

## B. BACT for “Anyway” Sources

For the reasons we have given, EPA overstepped its statutory authority when it decided that a source could

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<sup>8</sup>JUSTICE BREYER argues, *post*, at 10 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part), that when the statutory permitting thresholds of 100 or 250 tons per year do not provide a “sensible regulatory line,” EPA is entitled to “read an unwritten exception” into “the particular number used by the statute”—by which he apparently means that the Agency is entitled to substitute a dramatically higher number, such as 100,000. We are aware of no principle of administrative law that would allow an agency to rewrite such a clear statutory term, and we shudder to contemplate the effect that such a principle would have on democratic governance.

JUSTICE BREYER, however, claims to perceive no difference between (a) reading the statute to exclude greenhouse gases from the term “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers, and (b) reading the statute to exclude sources emitting less than 100,000 tons per year from the statutory phrase “any . . . source with the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more.” See *post*, at 7. The two could scarcely be further apart. As we have explained (and as EPA agrees), statutory context makes plain that the Act’s operative provisions use “air pollutant” to denote less than the full range of pollutants covered by the Act-wide definition. See Part II–A–1, *supra*. It is therefore incumbent on EPA to specify the pollutants encompassed by that term in the context of a particular program, and to do so reasonably in light of that program’s overall regulatory scheme. But there is no ambiguity whatsoever in the specific, numerical permitting thresholds, and thus no room for EPA to exercise discretion in selecting a different threshold.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

25

## Opinion of the Court

become subject to PSD or Title V permitting by reason of its greenhouse-gas emissions. But what about “anyway” sources, those that would need permits based on their emissions of more conventional pollutants (such as particulate matter)? We now consider whether EPA reasonably interpreted the Act to require those sources to comply with “best available control technology” emission standards for greenhouse gases.

## 1

To obtain a PSD permit, a source must be “subject to the best available control technology” for “each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act]” that it emits. §7475(a)(4). The Act defines BACT as “an emission limitation based on the maximum degree of reduction of each pollutant subject to regulation” that is “achievable . . . through application of production processes and available methods, systems, and techniques, including fuel cleaning, clean fuels, or treatment or innovative fuel combustion techniques.” §7479(3). BACT is determined “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” *Ibid.*

Some petitioners urge us to hold that EPA may never require BACT for greenhouse gases—even when a source must undergo PSD review based on its emissions of conventional pollutants—because BACT is fundamentally unsuited to greenhouse-gas regulation. BACT, they say, has traditionally been about end-of-stack controls “such as catalytic converters or particle collectors”; but applying it to greenhouse gases will make it more about regulating energy use, which will enable regulators to control “every aspect of a facility’s operation and design,” right down to the “light bulbs in the factory cafeteria.” Brief for Petitioner Energy-Intensive Manufacturers Working Group on Greenhouse Gas Regulation et al. in No. 12–1254, p. 7; see Joint Reply Brief for Petitioners in No. 12–1248 etc., pp.

## Opinion of the Court

14–15 (“BACT for [greenhouse gases] becomes an unbounded exercise in command-and-control regulation” of everything from “efficient light bulbs” to “basic industrial processes”). But see Brief for Calpine Corp. as *Amicus Curiae* 10 (“[I]n Calpine’s experience with ‘anyway’ sources, the [greenhouse-gas] analysis was only a small part of the overall permitting process”).

EPA has published a guidance document that lends some credence to petitioners’ fears. It states that at least initially, compulsory improvements in energy efficiency will be the “foundation” of greenhouse-gas BACT, with more traditional end-of-stack controls either not used or “added as they become more available.” PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases 29 (Mar. 2011) (hereinafter Guidance); see Peloso & Dobbins, Greenhouse Gas PSD Permitting: The Year in Review, 42 *Tex. Env. L. J.* 233, 247 (2012) (“Because [other controls] tend to prove infeasible, energy efficiency measures dominate the [greenhouse-gas] BACT controls approved by the states and EPA”). But EPA’s guidance also states that BACT analysis should consider options *other than* energy efficiency, such as “carbon capture and storage.” Guidance 29, 32, 35–36, 42–43. EPA argues that carbon capture is reasonably comparable to more traditional, end-of-stack BACT technologies, *id.*, at 32, n. 86, and petitioners do not dispute that.

Moreover, assuming without deciding that BACT may be used to force some improvements in energy efficiency, there are important limitations on BACT that may work to mitigate petitioners’ concerns about “unbounded” regulatory authority. For one, BACT is based on “control technology” for the applicant’s “proposed facility,” §7475(a)(4); therefore, it has long been held that BACT cannot be used to order a fundamental redesign of the facility. See, *e.g.*, *Sierra Club v. EPA*, 499 F. 3d 653, 654–655 (CA7 2007); *In re Pennsauken Cty., N. J., Resource*

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

27

## Opinion of the Court

*Recovery Facility*, 2 E. A. D. 667, 673 (EAB 1988). For another, EPA has long interpreted BACT as required only for pollutants that the source itself emits, see 44 Fed. Reg. 51947 (1979); accordingly, EPA acknowledges that BACT may not be used to require “reductions in a facility’s demand for energy from the electric grid.” Guidance 24. Finally, EPA’s guidance suggests that BACT should not require every conceivable change that could result in minor improvements in energy efficiency, such as the aforementioned light bulbs. *Id.*, at 31. The guidance explains that permitting authorities should instead consider whether a proposed regulatory burden outweighs any reduction in emissions to be achieved, and should concentrate on the facility’s equipment that uses the largest amounts of energy. *Ibid.*

## 2

The question before us is whether EPA’s decision to require BACT for greenhouse gases emitted by sources otherwise subject to PSD review is, as a general matter, a permissible interpretation of the statute under *Chevron*. We conclude that it is.

The text of the BACT provision is far less open-ended than the text of the PSD and Title V permitting triggers. It states that BACT is required “for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” (*i.e.*, the entire Act), §7475(a)(4), a phrase that—as the D. C. Circuit wrote 35 years ago—“would not seem readily susceptible [of] misinterpretation.” *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, 636 F. 2d 323, 404 (1979). Whereas the dubious breadth of “any air pollutant” in the permitting triggers suggests a role for agency judgment in identifying the subset of pollutants covered by the particular regulatory program at issue, the more specific phrasing of the BACT provision suggests that the necessary judgment has already been made by Congress. The wider statutory context likewise does not

## Opinion of the Court

suggest that the BACT provision can bear a narrowing construction: There is no indication that the Act elsewhere uses, or that EPA has interpreted, “each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” to mean anything other than what it says.

Even if the text were not clear, applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a dramatic expansion of agency authority, as to convince us that EPA’s interpretation is unreasonable. We are not talking about extending EPA jurisdiction over millions of previously unregulated entities, but about moderately increasing the demands EPA (or a state permitting authority) can make of entities already subject to its regulation. And it is not yet clear that EPA’s demands will be of a significantly different character from those traditionally associated with PSD review. In short, the record before us does not establish that the BACT provision as written is incapable of being sensibly applied to greenhouse gases.

We acknowledge the potential for greenhouse-gas BACT to lead to an unreasonable and unanticipated degree of regulation, and our decision should not be taken as an endorsement of all aspects of EPA’s current approach, nor as a free rein for any future regulatory application of BACT in this distinct context. Our narrow holding is that nothing in the statute categorically prohibits EPA from interpreting the BACT provision to apply to greenhouse gases emitted by “anyway” sources.

However, EPA may require an “anyway” source to comply with greenhouse-gas BACT only if the source emits more than a *de minimis* amount of greenhouse gases. As noted above, the Tailoring Rule applies BACT only if a source emits greenhouse gases in excess of 75,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e, but the Rule makes clear that EPA did not arrive at that number by identifying the *de minimis* level. See nn. 1, 3, *supra*. EPA may establish an appropriate *de*

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

29

Opinion of SCALIA, J.

*minimis* threshold below which BACT is not required for a source’s greenhouse-gas emissions. We do not hold that 75,000 tons per year CO<sub>2</sub>e necessarily exceeds a true *de minimis* level, only that EPA must justify its selection on proper grounds. Cf. *Alabama Power, supra*, at 405.<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \*

To sum up: We hold that EPA exceeded its statutory authority when it interpreted the Clean Air Act to require PSD and Title V permitting for stationary sources based on their greenhouse-gas emissions. Specifically, the Agency may not treat greenhouse gases as a pollutant for purposes of defining a “major emitting facility” (or a “modification” thereof) in the PSD context or a “major source” in the Title V context. To the extent its regulations purport to do so, they are invalid. EPA may, however, continue to treat greenhouse gases as a “pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter” for purposes of requiring BACT for “anyway” sources. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part.

*It is so ordered.*

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<sup>9</sup>JUSTICE ALITO argues that BACT is “fundamentally incompatible” with greenhouse gases for two reasons. *Post*, at 4 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). First, BACT requires consideration of “ambient air quality at the proposed site and in areas which may be affected by emissions from [the proposed] facility for each pollutant subject to regulation under this chapter,” §7475(e)(1); see also §7475(e)(3)(B); and it is not obvious how that requirement should apply, or even whether it can apply, to greenhouse gases. *Post*, at 4–5. But the possibility that that requirement may be inoperative as to greenhouse gases does not convince us that they must be categorically excluded from BACT even though they are indisputably a “pollutant subject to regulation.” Second, JUSTICE ALITO argues that EPA’s guidance on how to implement greenhouse-gas BACT is a recipe for “arbitrary and inconsistent decisionmaking.” *Post*, at 8. But we are not reviewing EPA’s guidance in these cases, and we cannot say that it is impossible for EPA and state permitting authorities to devise rational ways of complying with the statute’s directive to determine BACT for greenhouse gases “on a case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” §7479(3).

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

1

Opinion of BREYER, J.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

Nos. 12–1146, 12–1248, 12–1254, 12–1268, 12–1269, and 12–1272

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,  
PETITIONER

12–1146

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,  
PETITIONERS

12–1248

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

ENERGY-INTENSIVE MANUFACTURERS WORKING  
GROUP ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1254

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1268

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1269

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,  
ET AL.; AND

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED  
STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1272

*v.*

Opinion of BREYER, J.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;  
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

[June 23, 2014]

JUSTICE BREYER, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U. S. 497 (2007), we held that greenhouse gases fall within the Clean Air Act’s general definition of the term “air pollutant,” 42 U. S. C. §7602(g). 549 U. S., at 528–529. We also held, consequently, that the Environmental Protection Agency is empowered and required by Title II of the Act to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from mobile sources (such as cars and trucks) if it decides that greenhouse gases “contribute to . . . air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare,” §7521(a)(1). 549 U. S., at 532–533. The EPA determined that greenhouse gases endanger human health and welfare, 74 Fed. Reg. 66496 (2009) (Endangerment Finding), and so it issued regulations for mobile emissions, 75 Fed. Reg. 25324 (2010) (Tailpipe Rule).

These cases take as a given our decision in *Massachusetts* that the Act’s *general definition* of “air pollutant” includes greenhouse gases. One of the questions posed by these cases is whether those gases fall within the scope of the phrase “any air pollutant” as that phrase is used in the more specific provisions of the Act here at issue. The Court’s answer is “no.” *Ante*, at 10–24. I disagree.

The Clean Air Act provisions at issue here are Title I’s Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) program, §7470 *et seq.*, and Title V’s permitting regime, §7661 *et seq.* By contrast to Title II, Titles I and V apply to stationary sources, such as power plants and factories. Un-

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

3

Opinion of BREYER, J.

der the PSD program, “major emitting facilities” constructed in the United States must meet certain requirements, including obtaining a permit that imposes emissions limitations, §7475(a)(1), and using “the best available control technology for each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act] emitted from” the facility, §7475(a)(4). Title V requires each “major source” to obtain an operating permit. §7661a(a).

These cases concern the definitions of “major emitting facility” and “major source,” each of which is defined to mean any stationary source that emits more than a threshold quantity of “any air pollutant.” See §7479(1) (“major emitting facility”); §§7602(j), 7661(2)(B) (“major source”). To simplify the exposition, I will refer only to the PSD program and its definition of “major emitting facility”; a parallel analysis applies to Title V.

As it is used in the PSD provisions,

“[t]he term ‘major emitting facility’ means any of [a list of specific categories of] stationary sources of air pollutants which emit, or have the potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air pollutant . . . . Such term also includes any other source with the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.” §7479(1).

To simplify further, I will ignore the reference to specific types of source that emit at least 100 tons per year (tpy) of any air pollutant. In effect, we are dealing with a statute that says that the PSD program’s regulatory requirements must be applied to

“any stationary source that has the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.”

The interpretive difficulty in these cases arises out of the definition’s use of the phrase “two hundred fifty tons

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

per year or more,” which I will call the “250 tpy threshold.” When applied to greenhouse gases, 250 tpy is far too low a threshold. As the Court explains, tens of thousands of stationary sources emit large quantities of one greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide. See *ante*, at 17–20, and n. 7. To apply the programs at issue here to all those sources would be extremely expensive and burdensome, counterproductive, and perhaps impossible; it would also contravene Congress’s intent that the programs’ coverage be limited to those large sources whose emissions are substantial enough to justify the regulatory burdens. *Ibid.* The EPA recognized as much, and it addressed the problem by issuing a regulation—the Tailoring Rule—that purports to raise the coverage threshold for greenhouse gases from the statutory figure of 250 tpy to 100,000 tpy in order to keep the programs’ coverage limited to “a relatively small number of large industrial sources.” 75 Fed. Reg. 31514, 31555 (2010); see *id.*, at 31523–31524.

The Tailoring Rule solves the practical problems that would have been caused by the 250 tpy threshold. But what are we to do about the statute’s language? The statute specifies a definite number—250, not 100,000—and it says that facilities that are covered by that number must meet the program’s requirements. The statute says nothing about agency discretion to change that number. What is to be done? How, given the statute’s language, can the EPA exempt from regulation sources that emit more than 250 but less than 100,000 tpy of greenhouse gases (and that also do not emit other regulated pollutants at threshold levels)?

The Court answers by (1) pointing out that regulation at the 250 tpy threshold would produce absurd results, (2) refusing to read the statute as compelling such results, and (3) consequently interpreting the phrase “*any* air pollutant” as containing an implicit exception for greenhouse gases. (Emphasis added.) Put differently, the

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

5

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

Court reads the statute as defining “major emitting facility” to mean “stationary sources that have the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant *except for those air pollutants, such as carbon dioxide, with respect to which regulation at that threshold would be impractical or absurd or would sweep in smaller sources that Congress did not mean to cover.*” See *ante*, at 15–16 (“[T]here is no insuperable textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in the permitting triggers of PSD and Title V to encompass only pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to exclude those atypical pollutants that, like greenhouse gases, are emitted in such vast quantities that their inclusion would radically transform those programs and render them unworkable as written”).

I agree with the Court that the word “any,” when used in a statute, does not normally mean “any in the universe.” Cf. *FCC v. NextWave Personal Communications Inc.*, 537 U. S. 293, 311 (2003) (BREYER, J., dissenting) (“‘Tell all customers that . . .’ does not refer to every customer of every business in the world”). Rather, “[g]eneral terms as used on particular occasions often carry with them implied restrictions as to scope,” *ibid.*, and so courts must interpret the word “any,” like all other words, in context. As Judge Learned Hand pointed out when interpreting another statute many years ago, “[w]e can best reach the meaning here, as always, by recourse to the underlying purpose, and, with that as a guide, by trying to project upon the specific occasion how we think persons, actuated by such a purpose, would have dealt with it, if it had been presented to them at the time.” *Borella v. Borden Co.*, 145 F. 2d 63, 64 (CA2 1944). The pursuit of that underlying purpose may sometimes require us to “abandon” a “literal interpretation” of a word like “any.” *Id.*, at 64–65.

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

The law has long recognized that terms such as “any” admit of unwritten limitations and exceptions. Legal philosophers like to point out that a statute providing that “[w]hoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be punished by death” need not encompass a man who kills in self-defense; nor must an ordinance imposing fines upon those who occupy a public parking spot for more than two hours penalize a driver who is unable to move because of a parade. See Fuller, *The Case of the Speluncean Explorers*, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616, 619, 624 (1949); see also *United States v. Kirby*, 7 Wall. 482, 485–487 (1869) (holding that a statute forbidding knowing and willful obstruction of the mail contains an implicit exception permitting a local sheriff to arrest a mail carrier). The maxim *cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex*—where a law’s rationale ceases to apply, so does the law itself—is not of recent origin. See, e.g., *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678, 699 (2001) (citing 1 E. Coke, *Institutes* \*70b); *Green v. Litter*, 8 Cranch 229, 249 (1814) (Story, J.) (“*cessante ratione, cessat ipsa lex*”).

I also agree with the Court’s point that “a generic reference to air pollutants” in the Clean Air Act need not “encompass every substance falling within the Act-wide definition” that we construed in *Massachusetts*, §7602(g). See *ante*, at 12–13. As the Court notes, the EPA has interpreted the phrase “any air pollutant,” which is used several times in the Act, as limited to “air pollutants *for which EPA has promulgated [new source performance standards]*” in the portion of the Act dealing with those standards, as limited to “*visibility-impairing* air pollutants” in the part of the Act concerned with deleterious effects on visibility, and as limited to “pollutants *for which the area is designated nonattainment*” in the part of the Act aimed at regions that fail to attain air quality standards. *Ibid.*

But I do not agree with the Court that the only way to

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

7

Opinion of BREYER, J.

avoid an absurd or otherwise impermissible result in these cases is to create an atextual greenhouse gas exception to the phrase “any air pollutant.” After all, the word “any” makes an earlier appearance in the definitional provision, which defines “major emitting facility” to mean “*any . . . source with the potential to emit two hundred and fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant.*” §7479(1) (emphasis added). As a linguistic matter, one can just as easily read an implicit exception for small-scale greenhouse gas emissions into the phrase “any source” as into the phrase “any air pollutant.” And given the purposes of the PSD program and the Act as a whole, as well as the specific roles of the different parts of the statutory definition, finding flexibility in “any source” is far more sensible than the Court’s route of finding it in “any air pollutant.”

The implicit exception I propose reads almost word for word the same as the Court’s, except that the location of the exception has shifted. To repeat, the Court reads the definition of “major emitting facility” as if it referred to “any source with the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant *except for those air pollutants, such as carbon dioxide, with respect to which regulation at that threshold would be impractical or absurd or would sweep in smaller sources that Congress did not mean to cover.*” I would simply move the implicit exception, which I’ve italicized, so that it applies to “source” rather than “air pollutant”: “any *source* with the potential to emit two hundred fifty tons per year or more of any air pollutant *except for those sources, such as those emitting unmanageably small amounts of greenhouse gases, with respect to which regulation at that threshold would be impractical or absurd or would sweep in smaller sources that Congress did not mean to cover.*”

From a legal, administrative, and functional perspective—that is, from a perspective that assumes that Congress was not merely trying to arrange words on paper but

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

was seeking to achieve a real-world *purpose*—my way of reading the statute is the more sensible one. For one thing, my reading is consistent with the specific purpose underlying the 250 tpy threshold specified by the statute. The purpose of that number was not to prevent the regulation of dangerous air pollutants that cannot be sensibly regulated at that particular threshold, though that is the effect that the Court’s reading gives the threshold. Rather, the purpose was to limit the PSD program’s obligations to larger sources while exempting the many small sources whose emissions are low enough that imposing burdensome regulatory requirements on them would be senseless.

Thus, the accompanying Senate Report explains that the PSD program “is reasonable and necessary for very large sources, such as new electrical generating plants or new steel mills. But the procedure would prove costly and potentially unreasonable if imposed on construction of storage facilities for a small gasoline jobber or on the construction of a new heating plant at a junior college.” S. Rep. No. 95–127, p. 96 (1977). And the principal sponsor of the Clean Air Act amendments at issue here, Senator Edmund Muskie, told the Senate that the program would not cover “houses, dairies, farms, highways, hospitals, schools, grocery stores, and other such sources.” 123 Cong. Rec. 18013, 18021 (1977).

The EPA, exercising the legal authority to which it is entitled under *Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.*, 467 U. S. 837 (1984), understood the threshold’s purpose in the same light. It explained that Congress’s objective was

“to limit the PSD program to large industrial sources because it was those sources that were the primary cause of the pollution problems in question and because those sources would have the resources to com-

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

9

Opinion of BREYER, J.

ply with the PSD requirements. Congress's mechanism for limiting PSD was the 100/250 tpy threshold limitations. Focused as it was primarily on NAAQS pollutants [that is, those air pollutants for which the EPA has issued a national ambient air quality standard under Title I of the Act, see *EPA v. EME Homer City Generation, L. P.*, 572 U. S. \_\_\_\_, \_\_ (2014) (slip op., at 4)], Congress considered sources that emit NAAQS pollutants in those quantities generally to be the large industrial sources to which it intended PSD to be limited." Tailoring Rule, 75 Fed. Reg. 31555.

The Court similarly acknowledges that "the PSD program and Title V are designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens." *Ante*, at 18; see also *Alabama Power Co. v. Costle*, 636 F. 2d 323, 353 (CADDC 1979) ("Congress's intention was to identify facilities which, due to their size, are financially able to bear the substantial regulatory costs imposed by the PSD provisions and which, as a group, are primarily responsible for emission of the deleterious pollutants that befoul our nation's air").

An implicit source-related exception would serve this statutory purpose while going no further. The implicit exception that the Court reads into the phrase "any air pollutant," by contrast, goes well beyond the limited congressional objective. Nothing in the statutory text, the legislative history, or common sense suggests that Congress, when it imposed the 250 tpy threshold, was trying to undermine its own deliberate decision to use the broad language "any air pollutant" by removing some substances (rather than some facilities) from the PSD program's coverage.

For another thing, a source-related exception serves the flexible nature of the Clean Air Act. We observed in *Mas-*

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

*sachusetts* that “[w]hile the Congresses that drafted” the Act “might not have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the Clean Air Act obsolete.” 549 U. S., at 532. We recognized that “[t]he broad language of” the Act-wide definition of “air pollutant” “reflects an intentional effort to confer the flexibility necessary to forestall such obsolescence.” *Ibid.*

The Court’s decision to read greenhouse gases out of the PSD program drains the Act of its flexibility and chips away at our decision in *Massachusetts*. What sense does it make to read the Act as generally granting the EPA the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions and then to read it as denying that power with respect to the programs for large stationary sources at issue here? It is anomalous to read the Act to require the EPA to regulate air pollutants that pose previously unforeseen threats to human health and welfare where “250 tons per year” is a sensible regulatory line but not where, by chemical or regulatory happenstance, a higher line must be drawn. And it is anomalous to read an unwritten exception into the more important phrase of the statutory definition (“any air pollutant”) when a similar unwritten exception to less important language (the particular number used by the statute) will do just as well. The implicit exception preferred by the Court produces all of these anomalies, while the source-related exception I propose creates none of them.

In addition, the interpretation I propose leaves the EPA with the sort of discretion as to interstitial matters that Congress likely intended it to retain. My interpretation gives the EPA nothing more than the authority to *exempt* sources from regulation insofar as the Agency reasonably determines that applying the PSD program to them would

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

11

Opinion of BREYER, J.

expand the program so much as to contravene Congress's intent. That sort of decision, which involves the Agency's technical expertise and administrative experience, is the kind of decision that Congress typically leaves to the agencies to make. Cf. *Barnhart v. Walton*, 535 U. S. 212, 222 (2002) (enumerating factors that we take to indicate that Congress intends the agency to exercise the discretion provided by *Chevron*). To read the Act to grant that discretion here is to read it as furthering Congress's (and the public's) interest in more effective, less wasteful regulation.

Last, but by no means least, a source-related exception advances the Act's overall purpose. That broad purpose, as set forth at the beginning of the statute, is "to protect and enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare and the productive capacity of its population." §7401(b)(1); see also §7470(1) (A purpose of the PSD program in particular is "to protect public health and welfare from any actual or potential adverse effect which in the Administrator's judgment may reasonably be anticipate[d] to occur from air pollution"); §7602(h) ("All language [in the Act] referring to effects on welfare includes . . . effects on . . . weather . . . and climate"). The expert agency charged with administering the Act has determined in its Endangerment Finding that greenhouse gases endanger human health and welfare, and so sensible regulation of industrial emissions of those pollutants is at the core of the purpose behind the Act. The broad "no greenhouse gases" exception that the Court reads into the statute unnecessarily undercuts that purpose, while my narrow source-related exception would leave the Agency with the tools it needs to further it.

\* \* \*

I agree with the Court's holding that stationary sources

## Opinion of BREYER, J.

that are subject to the PSD program because they emit other (non-greenhouse-gas) pollutants in quantities above the statutory threshold—those facilities that the Court refers to as “anyway” sources—must meet the “best available control technology” requirement of §7475(a)(4) with respect to greenhouse gas emissions. I therefore join Part II–B–2 of the Court’s opinion. But as for the Court’s holding that the EPA cannot interpret the language at issue here to cover facilities that emit more than 100,000 tpy of greenhouse gases by virtue of those emissions, I respectfully dissent.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

1

Opinion of ALITO, J.

**SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES**

Nos. 12–1146, 12–1248, 12–1254, 12–1268, 12–1269, and 12–1272

UTILITY AIR REGULATORY GROUP,  
PETITIONER

12–1146

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

AMERICAN CHEMISTRY COUNCIL, ET AL.,  
PETITIONERS

12–1248

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

ENERGY-INTENSIVE MANUFACTURERS WORKING  
GROUP ON GREENHOUSE GAS REGULATION,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1254

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

SOUTHEASTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,  
ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1268

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;

TEXAS, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1269

*v.*

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,  
ET AL.; AND

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF THE UNITED  
STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS

12–1272

*v.*

Opinion of ALITO, J.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, ET AL.;  
ON WRITS OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF  
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT  
[June 23, 2014]

JUSTICE ALITO, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

In *Massachusetts v. EPA*, 549 U. S. 497 (2007), this Court considered whether greenhouse gases fall within the Clean Air Act’s general definition of an air “pollutant.” *Id.*, at 528–529. The Environmental Protection Agency cautioned us that “key provisions of the [Act] cannot co-gently be applied to [greenhouse gas] emissions,” Brief for Federal Respondent in *Massachusetts v. EPA*, O. T. 2006, No. 05–1120, p. 22, but the Court brushed the warning aside and had “little trouble” concluding that the Act’s “sweeping definition” of a pollutant encompasses greenhouse gases. 549 U. S., at 528–529. I believed *Massachusetts v. EPA* was wrongly decided at the time, and these cases further expose the flaws with that decision.

I

As the present cases now show, trying to fit greenhouse gases into “key provisions” of the Clean Air Act involves more than a “little trouble.” These cases concern the provisions of the Act relating to the “Prevention of Significant Deterioration” (PSD), 42 U. S. C. §§7470–7492, as well as Title V of the Act, §7661. And in order to make those provisions apply to greenhouse gases in a way that does not produce absurd results, the EPA effectively amended the Act. The Act contains specific emissions thresholds that trigger PSD and Title V coverage, but the EPA crossed out the figures enacted by Congress and substituted figures of its own.

I agree with the Court that the EPA is neither required nor permitted to take this extraordinary step, and I there-

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

3

Opinion of ALITO, J.

fore join Parts I and II–A of the Court’s opinion.

## II

I do not agree, however, with the Court’s conclusion that what it terms “anyway sources,” *i.e.*, sources that are subject to PSD and Title V permitting as the result of the emission of conventional pollutants, must install “best available control technology” (BACT) for greenhouse gases. As is the case with the PSD and Title V thresholds, trying to fit greenhouse gases into the BACT analysis badly distorts the scheme that Congress adopted.

The Court gives two main reasons for concluding that BACT applies to “anyway” sources, one based on text and one based on practical considerations. Neither is convincing.

### A

With respect to the text, it is curious that the Court, having departed from a literal interpretation of the term “pollutant” in Part II–A, turns on its heels and adopts a literal interpretation in Part II–B. The coverage thresholds at issue in Part II–A apply to any “pollutant.” The Act’s general definition of this term is broad, and in *Massachusetts v. EPA*, *supra*, the Court held that this definition covers greenhouse gases. The Court does not disturb that holding, but it nevertheless concludes that, as used in the provision triggering PSD coverage, the term “pollutant” actually means “pollutant, other than a greenhouse gas.”

In Part II–B, the relevant statutory provision says that BACT must be installed for any “pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act].” §7475(a)(4). If the term “pollutant” means “pollutant, other than a greenhouse gas,” as the Court effectively concludes in Part II–A, the term “pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act]” in §7475(a)(4) should mean “pollutant, other than a green-

Opinion of ALITO, J.

house gas, subject to regulation under [the Act], and that is subject to regulation under [the Act].” The Court’s literalism is selective, and it results in a strange and disjointed regulatory scheme.

Under the Court’s interpretation, a source can emit an unlimited quantity of greenhouse gases without triggering the need for a PSD permit. Why might Congress have wanted to allow this? The most likely explanation is that the PSD permitting process is simply not suited for use in regulating this particular pollutant. And if that is so, it makes little sense to require the installation of BACT for greenhouse gases in those instances in which a source happens to be required to obtain a permit due to the emission of a qualifying quantity of some other pollutant that is regulated under the Act.

## B

The Court’s second reason for holding that BACT applies to “anyway” sources is its belief that this can be done without disastrous consequences. Only time will tell whether this hope is well founded, but it seems clear that BACT analysis is fundamentally incompatible with the regulation of greenhouse-gas emissions for at least two important reasons.

### 1

First, BACT looks to the effects of covered pollutants in the area in which a source is located. The PSD program is implemented through “emission limitations and such other measures” as are “necessary . . . to prevent significant deterioration of air quality *in each region.*” §7471 (emphasis added). The Clean Air Act provides that BACT must be identified “on a case-by-case basis,” §7479(3), and this necessarily means that local conditions must be taken into account. For this reason, the Act instructs the EPA to issue regulations requiring an analysis of “the ambient air

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

5

Opinion of ALITO, J.

quality . . . *at the site of the proposed major emitting facility and in the area potentially affected* by the emissions from such facility for each pollutant regulated under [the Act].” §7475(e)(3)(B) (emphasis added). The Act also requires a public hearing on “the air quality *at the proposed site and in areas which may be affected* by emissions from such facility for each pollutant subject to regulation under [the Act] which will be emitted from such facility.” §§7475(a)(2), (e)(1) (emphasis added). Accordingly, if BACT is required for greenhouse gases, the Act demands that the impact of these gases in the area surrounding a site must be monitored, explored at a public hearing, and considered as part of the permitting process. The effects of greenhouse gases, however, are global, not local. See PSD and Title V Permitting Guidance for Greenhouse Gases 41–42 (Mar. 2011) (hereinafter Guidance). As a result, the EPA has declared that PSD permit applicants and permitting officials may disregard these provisions of the Act. 75 Fed. Reg. 31520 (2010).

2

Second, as part of the case-by-case analysis required by BACT, a permitting authority must balance the environmental benefit expected to result from the installation of an available control measure against adverse consequences that may result, including any negative impact on the environment, energy conservation, and the economy. And the EPA itself has admitted that this cannot be done on a case-by-case basis with respect to greenhouse gases.

The Clean Air Act makes it clear that BACT must be determined on a “case-by-case basis, taking into account energy, environmental, and economic impacts and other costs.” §7479(3). To implement this directive, the EPA adopted a five-step framework for making a BACT determination. See New Source Review Workshop Manual: Prevention of Significant Deterioration and Nonattain-

Opinion of ALITO, J.

ment Area Permitting (Oct. 1990).<sup>1</sup> Under the fourth step of this analysis, potentially applicable and feasible control technologies that are candidates for selection as BACT for a particular source are eliminated from consideration based on their “collateral impacts,” such as any adverse environmental effects or adverse effects on energy consumption or the economy.

More recently, the EPA provided guidance to permitting authorities regarding the treatment of greenhouse-gas emissions under this framework, and the EPA’s guidance demonstrates the insuperable problem that results when an attempt is made to apply this framework to greenhouse gas emissions. As noted above, at step 4 of the framework, a permitting authority must balance the positive effect likely to result from requiring a particular source to install a particular technology against a variety of negative effects that are likely to occur if that step is taken. But in the case of greenhouse gases, how can a permitting authority make this individualized, source-specific determination?

The EPA instructs permitting authorities to take into

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<sup>1</sup>The EPA describes these steps as follows:

(1) The applicant must identify all available control options that are potentially applicable by consulting EPA’s BACT clearinghouse along with other reliable sources.

(2) The technical feasibility of the control options identified in step 1 are eliminated based on technical infeasibility.

(3) The control technologies are ranked based on control effectiveness, by considering: the percentage of the pollutant removed; expected emission rate for each new source review (NSR) pollutant; expected emission reduction for each regulated NSR pollutant; and output based emissions limit.

(4) Control technologies are eliminated based on collateral impacts, such as: energy impacts; other environmental impacts; solid or hazardous waste; water discharge from control device; emissions of air toxics and other non-NSR regulated pollutants; and economic impacts.

(5) The most effective control option not eliminated in step 4 is proposed as BACT for the pollutant and emission unit under review.

Cite as: 573 U. S. \_\_\_\_ (2014)

7

Opinion of ALITO, J.

consideration all the adverse effects that the EPA has found to result from *the overall increase* in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. These include an increased risk of dangerous heat waves, hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and drought, as well as risks to agriculture, forestry, and water resources. Guidance 40–41. But the EPA admits that it is simply not possible for a permitting authority to calculate in any meaningful way the degree to which any potential reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from any individual source might reduce these risks. And without making such a calculation in even a very rough way, a permitting authority cannot do what the Clean Air Act and the EPA’s framework demand—compare the benefits of some specified reduction in the emission of greenhouse gases from a particular source with any adverse environmental or economic effects that might result from mandating such a reduction.

Suppose, for example, that a permitting authority must decide whether to mandate a change that both decreases a source’s emission of greenhouse gases and increases its emission of a conventional pollutant that has a negative effect on public health. How should a permitting authority decide whether to require this change? Here is the EPA’s advice:

“[W]hen considering the trade-offs between the environmental impacts of a particular level of GHG [greenhouse gas] reduction and a collateral increase in another regulated NSR pollutant,<sup>2</sup> rather than attempting to determine or characterize specific environmental impacts from GHGs emitted at particular locations, EPA recommends that permitting authorities focus on the amount of GHG emission reductions

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<sup>2</sup>“New source review pollutants” are those pollutants for which a National Ambient Air Quality standard has been set and a few others, such as sulphur dioxide. See 40 CFR 51.165(a)(1)(xxxvii) (2013).

Opinion of ALITO, J.

that may be gained or lost by employing a particular control strategy and how that compares to the environmental or other impacts resulting from the collateral emissions increase of other regulated NSR pollutants.” Guidance 42.

As best I can make out, what this means is that permitting authorities should not even try to assess the net impact on public health. Instead of comparing the positive and negative public health effects of a particular option, permitting authorities are instructed to compare the adverse public health effects of increasing the emissions of the conventional pollutants with the amount of the reduction of the source’s emissions of greenhouse gases. But without knowing the positive effects of the latter, this is a meaningless comparison.

The EPA tries to ameliorate this problem by noting that permitting authorities are entitled to “a great deal of discretion,” Guidance 41, but without a comprehensible standard, what this will mean is arbitrary and inconsistent decisionmaking. That is not what the Clean Air Act contemplates.<sup>3</sup>

\* \* \*

BACT analysis, like the rest of the Clean Air Act, was developed for use in regulating the emission of conventional pollutants and is simply not suited for use with respect to greenhouse gases. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part II–B–2 of the opinion of the Court.

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<sup>3</sup>While I do not think that BACT applies at all to “anyway sources,” if it is to apply, the limitations suggested in Part II–B–1 might lessen the inconsistencies highlighted in Part II of this opinion, and on that understanding I join Part II–B–1.



UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20460

JUL 24 2014

OFFICE OF  
AIR AND RADIATION

**MEMORANDUM**

**SUBJECT:** Next Steps and Preliminary Views on the Application of Clean Air Act Permitting Programs to Greenhouse Gases Following the Supreme Court's Decision in *Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency*

**FROM:** Janet G. McCabe, Acting Assistant Administrator   
Office of Air and Radiation

Cynthia Giles, Assistant Administrator   
Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance

**TO:** Regional Administrators, Regions 1-10

On June 23, 2014, the United States Supreme Court issued a decision addressing the application of stationary source permitting requirements to greenhouse gases (GHG). *Utility Air Regulatory Group (UARG) v. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)* (No. 12-1146). The EPA actions at issue in the case included those generally known as the "Tailoring Rule" and the "Timing Decision." In very brief summary, the Supreme Court said that the EPA may not treat greenhouse gases as an air pollutant for purposes of determining whether a source is a major source required to obtain a Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD) or title V permit. The Supreme Court also said that the EPA could continue to require that PSD permits, otherwise required based on emissions of conventional pollutants, contain limitations on GHG emissions based on the application of Best Available Control Technology (BACT). The EPA is continuing to examine the implications of the Supreme Court's decision, including how the EPA will need to revise its permitting regulations and related impacts to state programs.

There will be further federal court action to apply the decision, but we know that you, as well as our partner agencies in state, local and tribal governments, have questions regarding how the decision affects PSD and title V permitting requirements in the meantime. Some of these questions have near term implications, in particular those related to pending PSD and title V permitting actions. The EPA intends to actively engage with stakeholders on time-sensitive actions, such as permit applications, state program submissions, and stationary source construction that may no longer need to meet certain permitting requirements. The EPA is likely to take other steps in the longer term and to respond to further court action in this case as needed.

Pending further EPA engagement in the ongoing judicial process before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit), the EPA plans to act consistent with its understanding of the Supreme Court's decision. This memorandum has two parts. First, it explains how the EPA intends to proceed at this point with respect to permit applications for Tailoring Rule "Step 2" sources and PSD modifications that were previously classified as major based solely on GHG emissions (thus requiring that the sources get permits). Second, this memorandum provides preliminary guidance in response to several questions regarding ongoing permitting requirements for "anyway sources" and some additional issues pertaining to permitting requirements for "Step 2" sources. We believe that the status of pending permit applications and whether certain projects need to apply for PSD and title V permits in light of the Supreme Court decision may be the most immediate questions.

### **1. Permit Applications for Sources and Modifications Previously Classified as "Major" Based Solely on Greenhouse Gas Emissions ("Step 2" Sources)**

In order to act consistent with its understanding of the Supreme Court's decision pending judicial action to effectuate the final decision, the EPA will no longer require PSD or title V permits for Step 2 sources. More specifically, the EPA will no longer apply or enforce federal regulatory provisions or the EPA-approved PSD State Implementation Plan (SIP) provisions that require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit if greenhouse gases are the only pollutant (i) that the source emits or has the potential to emit above the major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase and a significant net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)). Nor does the EPA intend to continue applying regulations that would require that states include in their SIP a requirement that such sources obtain PSD permits.

Similarly, the EPA will no longer apply or enforce federal regulatory provisions or provisions of the EPA-approved title V programs that require a stationary source to obtain a title V permit solely because the source emits or has the potential to emit greenhouse gases above the major source thresholds (e.g., the regulatory provision relating to GHG under the definition of "subject to regulation" in 40 CFR 71.2). The EPA also does not intend to continue applying regulations that would require title V programs submitted for approval by the EPA to require that such sources obtain title V permits.

Thus, the EPA does not intend to continue processing PSD or Title V permit applications for Step 2 sources or require new applications for such permits in cases where the EPA is the permitting authority.

In summary, in order to act consistently with its understanding of the Supreme Court's decision pending judicial action to effectuate the final decision, the EPA will not apply or enforce the following regulatory requirements:

- Federal regulations or the EPA-approved PSD SIP provisions that require a stationary source to obtain a PSD permit if GHG are the only pollutant (i) that the source emits or has the potential to emit above the major source thresholds, or (ii) for which there is a significant emissions increase and a significant net emissions increase from a modification (e.g., 40 CFR 52.21(b)(49)(v)).
- Federal regulations or provisions in the EPA-approved title V programs that require a stationary source to obtain a title V permit solely because the source emits or has the potential to emit GHG above the major source thresholds.

As discussed further below, we recommend that Regional Offices confer with state, local and tribal permitting authorities and permit applicants to discuss how to handle permit applications pending with those agencies.

## **2. Preliminary EPA Views Regarding Other Questions Raised by Supreme Court Decision**

The remainder of this memorandum is intended simply to provide a clear statement of the EPA's present understanding of the implications of the Supreme Court's decision on additional subjects regarding permitting requirements. The following is not intended to represent a definitive or final statement by the agency on these issues. In fact, the EPA expects that some changes or refinements to the following guidance may result as the EPA examines these matters further in the course of judicial proceedings, discussions with stakeholders, and forthcoming action with respect to permit applications, issued permits, and approval of state programs.<sup>1</sup>

### Next Steps in the Legal Process Following the Supreme Court's Decision

Additional steps have yet to occur in the U.S. Courts to implement the Supreme Court decision. Since no party requested reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision by the applicable deadline under Supreme Court rules, the EPA expects that the Supreme Court's decision will become final shortly. This will be the case as soon as the Supreme Court sends its decision down to the D.C. Circuit for further proceedings. After this occurs, we expect that the D.C. Circuit will issue an order that leads to a process that identifies particular parts of the regulations adopted in the Tailoring Rule and earlier EPA regulations that the EPA must revise (remanding the regulations) or that are struck down (vacating the regulations). The EPA and the Department of Justice expect to soon begin a process of consulting with the parties to the litigation regarding this step of the court process.

### PSD Construction Permit Requirements

#### *Sources Triggering PSD Based on Pollutants Other Than GHG*

The Supreme Court upheld application of the BACT requirement to greenhouse gas emissions from new and modified sources that trigger PSD permitting obligations on the basis of their emissions of air pollutants other than GHG (also known as "Step 1" or "anyway sources"). In the EPA's current view, Step 1 sources remain subject to the PSD BACT requirement for GHG, as well as other pollutants, if they emit those pollutants at or above certain thresholds. With respect to new "anyway sources," the EPA intends to continue applying the PSD BACT requirement to GHG emissions if the source emits or has the potential to emit 75,000 tons per year (tpy) or more of GHG on a carbon dioxide equivalent (CO<sub>2</sub>e) basis. With respect to modified "anyway sources," the EPA intends to continue applying the PSD BACT requirements to GHG if both of the following circumstances are present: (1) the modification is otherwise subject to PSD for a pollutant other than GHG; (2) the modification results in a GHG emissions increase and a net GHG emissions increase equal to or greater than 75,000 tpy CO<sub>2</sub>e and greater than zero on a mass basis.

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<sup>1</sup> Since it provides general guidance on these issues, the remainder of this memorandum does not itself create any rights or impose any new obligations or prohibitions, and is not intended to be a basis for enforcement actions. The guidance that follows from this point may not be appropriate for all situations, and EPA retains the discretion to approach issues differently than recommended here in specific situations that may arise.

The part of the Supreme Court opinion that affirmed application of BACT to greenhouse gases at “anyway sources” also noted that the EPA may limit application of BACT to greenhouse gases to those situations where a permit applicant’s source has the potential to emit GHG above a specified threshold (or *de minimis*) level. The Supreme Court explained that the EPA would need to justify its *de minimis* threshold on proper grounds. In the meantime, to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act at present, the EPA intends to continue applying BACT to GHG at “anyway sources” and processing PSD permit applications for “anyway sources” using a 75,000 tpy CO<sub>2e</sub> threshold to determine whether a permit must include a BACT limitation for greenhouse gases, pending further developments. Such further developments may include action by the D.C. Circuit, input received by the EPA from stakeholders in connection with the court process, experience applying this approach in individual permitting actions, and further EPA action to consider whether to promulgate a *de minimis* level and what level would be appropriate. Thus, for now, the EPA believes the best course of action with respect to “anyway sources” is to continue applying existing regulations.

#### *Sources Triggering PSD Solely Based on GHG Emissions*

Subject to the considerations discussed below, headquarters recommends that Regional Offices confer with state, local, and tribal permitting authorities and permit applicants to explore their plans to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision. These conversations should examine whether, in light of the Supreme Court decision, there is flexibility under state, local and tribal laws to determine that Step 2 sources no longer are required to obtain PSD permits prior to the completion of any actions to repeal or revise such regulations to in light of the Supreme Court decision. The EPA understands that some states have provisions in their laws that may automatically modify state-law permitting requirements based on the Supreme Court’s decision. To the extent such provisions were approved by the EPA as part of a SIP, Regional Offices should encourage such states to contact the EPA to discuss implementation of those provisions. We do not read the Supreme Court decision to preclude states from retaining permitting requirements for sources of GHG emissions that apply independently under state law even where those requirements are no longer required under federal law.

Regional Offices should be mindful that even if the EPA is not requiring Step 2 sources to obtain a PSD permit under federal law, such sources likely have a continuing obligation to obtain minor source construction permits under the applicable SIP as a result of their emissions of non-GHG pollutants. Thus, we recommend discussing with state, local, and tribal permitting authorities and permit applicants, the feasibility of converting pending permit applications into minor source permit applications and proceeding on that basis where appropriate.

We plan to provide additional views in the future with respect to Step 2 sources that have already obtained a PSD permit, but our general thinking at this time is that it may be appropriate to ultimately remove GHG BACT limitations from such permits and to convert such permits into minor source permits where this is feasible and minor source requirements remain applicable. We encourage Regional Offices to contact states to discuss their ability to proceed consistent with the outcome of the Supreme Court decision on individual permitting matters.

### Title V Operating Permits

While the EPA will no longer apply or enforce the requirement that a source obtain a title V permit solely because it emits or has the potential to emit greenhouse gases above major source thresholds, the agency does not read the Supreme Court decision to affect other grounds on which a title V permit may be required or the applicable requirements that must be addressed in title V permits. For example, the EPA currently believes it is still appropriate for a title V permit to incorporate and assure compliance with greenhouse gas BACT limits that remain applicable requirements under a PSD permit issued to a Step 1 “anyway source.”

We recommend that Regional Offices confer with state, local, and tribal permitting authorities and permit applicants regarding their plans to respond to the Supreme Court’s decision. These conversations should examine whether, in light of the Supreme Court decision, there is flexibility under state, local, and tribal laws to determine that Step 2 sources are no longer required to obtain title V permits prior to the completion of any actions to repeal or revise such regulations in light of the Supreme Court decision. To the extent that any approved state, local or tribal title V programs have provisions in their laws that may automatically modify state, local or tribal-law permitting requirements based on the Supreme Court’s decision, Regional Offices should encourage such permitting authorities to contact the EPA to discuss implementation of those provisions. Similar to state-law construction permitting requirements, the Supreme Court decision does not preclude states from continuing to require that certain types of sources obtain operating permits meeting requirements that apply independently under state law. Thus, we recommend that Regional Offices advise sources to consult with their individual permitting authorities regarding operating permit requirements after the Supreme Court’s decision.

With respect to title V permits that have already been issued to Step 2 sources, we recommend that such sources consult with their title V permitting authority to determine the appropriate next steps based on the source’s specific permitting situation.

### Federal PSD and Title V Rules, SIP and State Title V Programs

The Office of Air and Radiation (OAR) anticipates a need for the EPA to revise federal PSD and title V rules<sup>2</sup> in light of the Supreme Court opinion. In addition, OAR anticipates that many SIPs and approved title V programs will be revised to effectuate the Supreme Court’s decision. The timing and content of the EPA’s actions with respect to the EPA regulations and state program approvals are expected to be informed by the forthcoming legal process before the D.C. Circuit. The EPA plans to consult with permitting authorities to determine the most efficient and least burdensome ways to accomplish any such revisions to state or tribal programs.

### GHG 5-Year Study

In the Tailoring Rule, the EPA described next steps to include a study by April 2015, referred to as the “5-year study,” and a possible further regulatory action, referred to as “Step 4.” OAR believes the results of the Supreme Court decision eliminate the need for the 5-year study. Thus, at this time, OAR is no longer working on the study, and we intend to inform states collecting data requested by the EPA for

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<sup>2</sup> The EPA is still evaluating the implications of the Supreme Court’s decision, if any, on GHG Plantwide Applicability Limitations which were finalized under Step 3 of the Tailoring Rule.

that study that this data collection is no longer necessary. In addition, the EPA does not intend to take further action on Step 4. The EPA is, however, continuing to evaluate GHG permitting data as appropriate with regard to the possible development and justification of an appropriate GHG significance (or “*de minimis*”) level for determining the application of PSD BACT requirements to GHG in permitting of “anyway sources.” We expect that the information that states have submitted for the 5-year study will be useful in that effort.

#### Assessment of Biogenic Carbon Dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) Emissions

The Supreme Court’s decision did not directly address the application of PSD and title V permitting requirements to biogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. On July 12, 2013, the D.C. Circuit issued a decision (the Deferral decision) overturning the EPA regulation that deferred application of these permitting programs to biogenic CO<sub>2</sub> emissions (the Deferral Rule). *Center for Biological Diversity v. EPA*, 722 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2013). However, the Deferral decision has not yet taken effect because some parties have been waiting for the Supreme Court decision to determine whether to ask the D.C. Circuit to reconsider its ruling on the Deferral Rule. Furthermore, court actions against the Tailoring Rule remain pending by parties that contend that the Tailoring Rule caused PSD and title V programs to apply to biogenic greenhouse gas emissions. Notwithstanding these matters still pending in the courts, the Deferral Rule itself expired on its own terms on July 21, 2014. The EPA’s work regarding the biogenic CO<sub>2</sub> assessment framework remains ongoing and is not directly impacted by the Supreme Court’s decision. Nonetheless, the EPA’s current view is that the Supreme Court’s decision effectively narrows the scope of the biogenic CO<sub>2</sub> permitting issues that remain for the EPA to address. This is because, as described above, the EPA will no longer apply or enforce regulatory provisions requiring PSD or title V permits for sources solely on the basis of their GHG emissions. Continuing our current approach, OAR recommends that Regional Offices consult with sources and permitting authorities on biomass related permitting questions as they arise.

#### Conclusion

We trust this information will be helpful as the EPA pursues next steps and await further developments before the U.S. Courts. Should you have questions generally concerning this memorandum, please contact Juan Santiago, Associate Division Director of the Air Quality Policy Division, Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards at [santiago.juan@epa.gov](mailto:santiago.juan@epa.gov) or 919-541-1084. Should you have questions generally concerning the enforcement specific aspects of this memorandum, please contact Apple Chapman, Associate Division Director, Air Enforcement Division, Office of Civil Enforcement at [chapman.apple@epa.gov](mailto:chapman.apple@epa.gov) or 202-564-5666.

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## VII-1

## Chapter VII

The following documentation of filing and notification is incorporated as part of this hearing record and is maintained on file:

1. Submission of Form 700, Publication on OAH Website, and material submitted to the Office of Administrative Hearings.
2. Submission of Filing Forms and material filed with Office of Administrative Hearings.
3. Letter transmitting hearing record to EPA.

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